verify_agent_signature
Neutral third-party Web Bot Auth verification. An origin — or the PDP deciding for it — received a request from a claimed agent carrying the Web Bot Auth headers (Signature, Signature-Input, Signature-Agent). Relay those headers here, plus the authority the request was addressed to, and TunnelMind verifies the Ed25519 signature against the agent's own published key directory (https:///.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory).
Facts, not a verdict: state: verified means "this signature
cryptographically verifies against that directory" — whether to trust
the agent behind it is your policy engine's call.
Use this tool when:
A request claims a cryptographic agent identity (Signature-Agent header present) and you must check the claim before serving it.
You want signature verification independent of your CDN — or you are not behind a CDN that implements Web Bot Auth at all.
Inputs (JSON body):
signature(required): the received Signature header value.signature_input(required): the received Signature-Input header value.signature_agent(required): the received Signature-Agent header value (quoted https origin).authority(required): the host the request was addressed to.method,path,scheme(optional): only needed if the signature's covered components include them.
Returns:
state: one ofverified— Ed25519 signature verifies against a key in the agent's published directory.invalid_signature— key found, signature does not verify (tampered or forged).unknown_key— directory reachable but contains no key with the claimed thumbprint.directory_unreachable— the claimed key directory did not answer; an honest degraded state, not evidence of forgery.expired— the signature'sexpirestimestamp has passed.malformed— headers do not parse as a Web Bot Auth signature.
key_id: the claimed RFC 7638 JWK thumbprint.directory_url: the resolved well-known directory URL.params: created/expires/alg/tag as sent.checks[]: per-check {name, pass, detail} facts a PDP can gate on.
Cost:
Counts as one request against the daily rate limit.
Latency:
Typical: <100ms when the agent's directory is KV-cached (1h TTL); up to ~5s on first sight of a new directory.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | No | ||
| method | No | ||
| scheme | No | ||
| authority | Yes | ||
| signature | Yes | ||
| signature_agent | Yes | ||
| signature_input | Yes |