TunnelMind Data API

verdict_lookup

The reconciliation layer in one call. Where cross_lens_verify answers "what is this network destination," verdict_lookup answers a different, sharper question about a key-addressed ACTOR: does what this key claims about itself match what the network has seen it do?

It fuses two sides:

claim — what the key can prove about itself: its attestation_tier across roots of trust (bare Ed25519 self-attestation → a RATS/EAT hardware/platform attestation). TunnelMind owns no silicon and reads every root; the tier is always measured/anchored, never self-asserted (a token claiming a higher tier than its trust anchor is trusted to assert is capped down).
conduct — what the graph has seen the key's subject do (Scry × Sigil × GhostRoute), supplied via the optional subject parameter.

The response carries reconciliation.contradictions (e.g. a key that attests silicon-root but behaves as a low-trust node → claim_exceeds_conduct; a presented claim that fails to verify → unverified_claim; claims presented with no proof of key control → key_control_unproven), a claim_vs_conduct_delta, and a verdict {tier, reputation, flags, confidence}.

Keys are linked to an identity ONLY when the actor cryptographically proves control — never inferred from behavioral correlation. An EAT that attests a different subject key is rejected, not silently merged.

The verdict is published as a self-verifying receipt: given the receipt bytes + the witness public keys carried inline, anyone re-derives the verdict and checks log inclusion OFFLINE with scripts/verify-verdict.mjs — no call back to TunnelMind. A bare, unattested key still gets a verdict (at self-asserted tier); attestation is never required to participate.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`eat`	No	A RATS/EAT compact JWS (EdDSA) attesting this key, signed by a trusted anchor.
`key`	Yes	The actor's Ed25519 public key, as hex (64 chars, optional 0x), base64url (43 chars, unpadded), or did:key (did:key:z6Mk…).
`sig`	No	Base64 Ed25519 signature over `nonce`, proving control of the key.
`nonce`	No	Binding nonce for a bare-Ed25519 self-attestation (paired with `sig`).
`claims`	No	URL-encoded JSON array of raw claim objects, e.g. `[{"type":"ed25519-self","signature":"…","nonce":"…"},{"type":"eat","token":"…"}]`. Overrides the `nonce`/`sig`/`eat` convenience params when present.
`subject`	No	An ip / domain / ASN / entity_slug the key claims to act as. Drives the conduct (graph behavior) side of the reconciliation. Omit for a claim-only verdict.

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses the capping-down of self-asserted tiers, rejection of EATs for different subject keys, the requirement of cryptographic proof for identity linking, and the offline-verifiable receipt mechanism.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but well-structured with bold labels and clear sections; every sentence serves to explain the tool's behavior, inputs, or outputs. It could be tightened, but the density is justified for the complexity.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool has no annotations and no output schema, yet the description explains the response shape (contradictions, delta, verdict), edge cases (unattested keys, rejected EATs), and even the offline verification script. This is a comprehensive picture for a complex tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already provides 100% coverage with detailed per-parameter descriptions, so the baseline is 3. The narrative adds conceptual context about claim vs conduct but doesn't introduce syntax or constraints beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly defines the tool as a reconciliation layer that answers whether a key's claims match its observed network conduct, and explicitly contrasts it with `cross_lens_verify`. It names the specific resource (key-addressed ACTOR) and the action (fusing claim and conduct into a verdict), distinguishing it from siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly positions the tool against `cross_lens_verify` ('Where `cross_lens_verify` answers... `verdict_lookup` answers a different...'), providing a clear alternative. It also gives usage guidance on the optional `subject` parameter and notes that attestation is never required, so agents know when a bare key can still be processed.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.3/5.0

Disambiguation2/5

Many tools overlap in purpose, such as cross_lens_verify, cross_lens_lookup, profile_entity, and preflight_should_i_act, which all return node verdicts with subtle differences. Sigil verification tools and receipt-related tools also have similar names and require deep reading to distinguish.

Naming Consistency3/5

The tool names are mostly readable, but the pattern is mixed: some use verb_noun (get_domain, create_subscription) while others use domain prefixes (sigil_*, ghostroute_*, intel_*). Within each domain, naming is consistent, but the overall style lacks uniformity.

Tool Count1/5

With 90 tools, this server is extremely overloaded. Even for a multi-purpose data API, the sheer number overwhelms and makes navigation difficult, far exceeding the typical well-scoped MCP server. The count is an extreme mismatch for the apparent scope.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface is very comprehensive, covering tracker lookup, cross-lens verification, receipts, compliance, subscriptions, tasks, intel probes, and more. Minor gaps exist, such as no batch cross-lens verification, but core workflows are well covered.

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