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TunnelMind Data API

sigil_atap_witness

Ingests one agent-reported event (bid:submitted, bid:won, bid:lost, budget:decremented) into an AIT's hash-chained attestation log. Sigil validates the payload (rejecting any PII per ATAP §7.6), classifies the evidence tier — anchored if a bid:submitted cites a valid Sigil token issued for this AIT and matching the bid's supply path, otherwise asserted — derives any constraint:violated events, then chains and signs each event.

supply:verified / supply:rejected are witness-emitted by sigil_verify_supply_path, never accepted here — that is what makes the witnessed tier non-bypassable.

Holder authentication (2026-10-16). Writes to an AIT's chain require Authorization: Bearer <holder_secret>, the secret sigil_atap_register_ait returns once. 401 without it, 403 if it does not match. AITs registered before holder authentication have no secret and are frozen for writes (403): register a new AIT to continue.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
aitYes
payloadYes
event_typeYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations exist, so the description carries the full burden and does: it discloses PII rejection, tier-classification rules (`anchored` vs `asserted`), derived `constraint:violated` events, chaining/signing, holder-secret auth with exact 401/403 semantics, and the frozen-AIT case. This is far beyond what a bare schema would convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with the core action and follows with tier logic, exclusions, and a clearly demarcated auth section. Dense but every sentence carries operational meaning; the bolded auth paragraph is long yet non-redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, no annotations, and 0% parameter description coverage, the description covers purpose, validation, tiering, exclusions, and auth thoroughly. It stops short of stating what a successful write returns, which matters given the absent output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It fully covers `event_type` by listing the accepted values, but leaves `payload` structure and the `ait` identifier's expected format undescribed, so it only partially compensates for the coverage gap. Baseline 3 fits a partial compensation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: it 'ingests one agent-reported event' into 'an AIT's hash-chained attestation log', naming the four accepted event types. It also distinguishes itself from the sibling `sigil_verify_supply_path`, which emits the witness-side events this tool refuses.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly enumerates accepted events and states a clear when-not: `supply:verified` / `supply:rejected` are 'witness-emitted by sigil_verify_supply_path, never accepted here'. That names the alternative and the condition that selects it, so routing is unambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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