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TunnelMind Data API

sigil_atap_register_ait

Registers an ATAP v0.1 AIT for a media-buying agent under the sigil:media_buyer:v1 profile. Sigil validates the capability set and constraints against the published profile, signs the AIT as the witness (OAI-2026-0000201), stores it, and returns the signed token.

Sigil is the ATAP witness — there is no kernel observer. See https://github.com/TunnelMind/atap-profiles.

The response carries holder_secret once (32 random bytes, base64url; only its SHA-256 is stored). It is what every later write to this AIT — sigil_atap_witness, sigil_atap_roll_block, sigil_receipt_generate — must present as Authorization: Bearer. Lose it and the AIT is frozen; register a new one. operator_status is asserted: Sigil signs the AIT but does not verify that the holder controls the operator OAI it names.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
profileYes
operatorYesThe agent operator's canonical OAI.
agent_typeNomedia-buyer
expires_atYes
constraintsYes
capabilitiesYes
attestation_policyYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so exceptionally: Sigil signs as witness (no kernel observer), holder_secret is returned once and only its SHA-256 is stored, losing it freezes the AIT, and operator_status is only 'asserted' (not verified). These are precisely the non-obvious behaviors an agent needs before invoking.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the purpose, then behavior; each sentence is information-dense (secret handling, freeze consequence, operator_status caveat). It is on the longer side but no sentence is filler, so the length is justified.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutation tool with no annotations and no output schema, it covers the critical behavioral contract (auth secret, one-time disclosure, freeze risk) and the key return field. It is slightly under-specified on the structure of the nested input objects, which is the remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 14% with 7 params including nested objects, so the description must compensate. It names profile, capabilities, and constraints at a high level, but gives no format or content guidance for attestation_policy, operator, expires_at, or agent_type, leaving most parameters undocumented in both places.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (registers) and resource (an ATAP v0.1 AIT) scoped to the sigil:media_buyer:v1 profile, and describes the full lifecycle (validate, sign, store, return signed token). It names the related sibling write tools, letting an agent place it precisely in the tool family.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clear context that this is the entry point for creating an AIT and that later writes (sigil_atap_witness, sigil_atap_roll_block, sigil_receipt_generate) depend on the returned holder_secret. However, it doesn't explicitly say when not to register or route to a sibling (e.g., sigil_atap_ait_status for checking existing state).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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