Get the EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) probability for one CVE, sourced from FIRST.org. Returns the daily probability (0-1) that the CVE will be exploited in the next 30 days plus a percentile rank. License: FIRST.org free-for-any-use.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | Yes | CVE identifier in CVE-YYYY-NNNNN form |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations provided, so description carries burden. It discloses source and license but does not explicitly state that it is read-only or mention any authentication or rate limits. The return values are described, but behavioral traits like non-destructiveness are implied.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no fluff. Each sentence adds value: first states purpose and source, second describes return and license.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple tool with one parameter and no output schema, the description adequately covers purpose, return values, and data source. No missing critical context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with a clear description of cve_id. Description adds no extra meaning beyond the schema, so baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description uses specific verb 'Get' and identifies the resource as 'EPSS probability for one CVE', sourced from FIRST.org. This clearly distinguishes from siblings like get_cve_record or get_kev_catalog.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Description states what the tool returns (probability and percentile rank) and implies usage when exploit prediction score is needed. No explicit when-not-to-use or alternatives, but the context is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Several security/vulnerability tools (check_ai_supply_chain_risk, get_cve_record, get_osv_advisory_by_id, get_osv_advisory_for_package) have overlapping purposes, making it potentially confusing to choose the right one. Other tools are more distinct, but the ambiguity in this cluster lowers the score.
All names are snake_case and mostly follow a verb_noun pattern, but the verbs are inconsistent (check, get, list, lookup, query, register, route, search, submit, whats_new). Some tools use 'get' while others use 'check' for similar retrieval actions, and 'whats_new' does not fit the verb_noun pattern.
With 27 tools, the count exceeds the 25 threshold for 'too many', even though the broad scope spans many domains. The sheer number makes the server feel heavy and harder to navigate.
The server covers a wide range of data domains, but notable gaps exist: no management of watch subscriptions (only register), no CVE search, and no model search. Write operations are minimal, leaving some workflows incomplete.
