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Confirm a burn from its signature

singularityagent__verify_burn
Read-only

Confirm that a Solana transaction really burned a token: which mint, which owner, how much, at finalized commitment. Pass mint (and optionally owner and a minimum amount) to check the burn against a claim rather than just describing it — a transaction that burned a different mint is refused by name. Reports whether the signature has already been redeemed, and never spends it. A signature is public the moment it lands, so this proves a burn happened and proves nothing about who quoted it; what binds a burn to a claimant is the memo the burner signed into it, which is returned when there is one.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
mintNoThe mint the burn must be of. Matched by address, never by symbol.
chainNoSolana chain id or alias. Defaults to "solana".
ownerNoThe wallet that must have signed the burn.
minimumNoThe least that must have been destroyed, as a human decimal amount, e.g. "1000".
signatureYesThe transaction signature of the burn.
expectMemoNoText the burn's memo must contain. The memo is the only part of the transaction the burner wrote and signed, so it is what makes a burn attributable to a claimant rather than to whoever quotes the signature first.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Previous value: -trueNew value: +false
    • addedInput schema / properties
      Added value: +{
      +  "chain": {
      +    "description": "Solana chain id or alias. Defaults to \"solana\".",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "expectMemo": {
      +    "description": "Text the burn's memo must contain. The memo is the only part of the transaction the burner wrote and signed, so it is what makes a burn attributable to a claimant rather than to whoever quotes the signature first.",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "minimum": {
      +    "description": "The least that must have been destroyed, as a human decimal amount, e.g. \"1000\".",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "mint": {
      +    "description": "The mint the burn must be of. Matched by address, never by symbol.",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "owner": {
      +    "description": "The wallet that must have signed the burn.",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "signature": {
      +    "description": "The transaction signature of the burn.",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  }
      +}
    • addedInput schema / required
      Added value: +[
      +  "signature"
      +]
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Despite having readOnlyHint and openWorldHint annotations, the description goes well beyond them. It clarifies that the tool never spends the signature, reports whether it was already redeemed, and explains the public nature of signatures and the role of the memo in attribution. These are crucial behavioral nuances that annotations alone do not convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: purpose, claim-checking behavior, redemption/spending safety, and attribution caveat are each covered in one short sentence. It is front-loaded with the most important information and remains appropriately sized for a security-sensitive verification tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with no output schema, the description covers everything an agent needs: what is verified, how to verify against a claim, the fact that it never spends the signature, what 'redeemed' means, and how memo attribution works. The only possible gap is exact return structure, but the description's behavioral coverage is sufficient for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds real semantic value by explaining how `mint`, `owner`, and `minimum` turn the call into a claim check, and by linking `expectMemo` to burn attribution. It does not add details for `chain` or `signature`, but those are already well documented in the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states a specific verb and resource: it confirms that a Solana transaction 'really burned a token' and enumerates exactly what is determined (mint, owner, amount, commitment level). It also differentiates itself from merely describing a transaction by framing the tool as a claim-checking operation, which is a distinct purpose among the sibling tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear context for when to use the tool: pass `mint`, `owner`, and `minimum` when checking a burn against a claim, and it notes that a mismatched mint is refused by name. It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives or state when not to use the tool, but the intended usage is clear enough for an agent to select it correctly.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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