Skip to main content
Glama
Sign In

Novence

by ai.novence
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

Reissue API key

reissue_key
Destructive

Mint a new primary account nv_ key from email OTP. No Bearer key required. WARNING: revokes the previous primary account key; named keys (create_api_key) keep working unless revoke_all is true. Also verifies email if needed.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "email": "<email>",
      "code": "<code>"
    },
    "name": "reissue_key"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
codeYesOTP from resend_verification or the latest verification email.
emailYesAccount email that owns the key.
revoke_allNoAlso revoke every named key. Use when a key may have leaked. Default false.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / revoke_all
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Also revoke every named key. Use when a key may have leaked. Default false.",
+  "type": "boolean"
+}
  2. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / code / description
      Added value: +"OTP from resend_verification or the latest verification email."
    • addedInput schema / properties / email / description
      Added value: +"Account email that owns the key."
  3. Added

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations already mark the tool as destructive, but the description adds important specifics: the previous primary account key is revoked, named keys survive unless revoke_all is true, and email verification may occur as a side effect. These details go beyond the annotations and help the agent understand the destructive scope. It does not mention reversibility or rate limits, but the added disclosure is substantial.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is three tight sentences with the purpose front-loaded, followed by auth context and then the destructive warning. Every sentence adds useful information, and the WARNING capitalization properly highlights the key risk.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a three-parameter destructive key-reissue tool with complete schema coverage and no output schema, the description covers purpose, authentication context, destructive effects, named-key behavior, and email verification. An agent has enough information to decide whether to call it and what side effects to expect.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so email, code, and revoke_all are already well documented in the input schema. The description reinforces that the code is an email OTP and that revoke_all affects named keys, but it does not add format or edge-case semantics beyond the schema. The baseline of 3 is appropriate when the schema carries the parameter documentation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Mint a new primary account nv_ key from email OTP.' It distinguishes this from named-key creation by noting that named keys use create_api_key and are unaffected unless revoke_all is true. An agent can identify exactly what this tool does without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear usage context: it is for minting a primary account key via email OTP and requires no Bearer key. It also references create_api_key for named keys and explains the revoke_all exception. However, it does not explicitly state when an agent should choose this tool versus verify_email or resend_verification, so it stops short of full when/when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Novence toolsInspect
Try in Browser
One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources