kev_recentRecent CISA KEV entries. Filter by vendor or ransomware-known flag.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Maximum vulnerabilities by CISA catalog date added; default 50, max 200. | |
| vendor | No | Case-insensitive substring of the CISA KEV vendor or project name, e.g. Microsoft. | |
| ransomware | No | Filter CISA known ransomware use to Known or Unknown; omit for both. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is fully covered. The description adds only the data source (CISA KEV) and the filter axes, and says nothing about ordering (implied date-added-desc only inside the limit schema) or result size behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences with the core scope front-loaded and no filler. The second sentence largely restates capabilities already in the schema, so it does not fully earn its place, but nothing is bloated.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a three-parameter, zero-required list tool with rich annotations and no output schema, the essentials are present. Still missing are the definition of 'recent' (sort order/time window) and what happens when no filters are supplied, which an agent would need to interpret results correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and all three parameters are well documented, including the enum values for ransomware and the max on limit. The description only restates the vendor and ransomware filters, adding no syntax, matching, or default details beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific resource (CISA KEV entries) and a recency scope, which separates it loosely from kev_by_vendor. However, 'Recent' is never quantified (no window or ordering statement), and the sibling kev_by_vendor is never named, so the boundary between the two is left to inference.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The second sentence describes capability (vendor/ransomware filtering) rather than when to use this tool, and it duplicates what the schema already says. There is no guidance on when to prefer this over kev_by_vendor, no exclusions, and no mention of paging behavior for the limit parameter.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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