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Mallory

searchVulnerabilities

Search and filter vulnerabilities in the MalloryAI database. Supports filtering by CVE ID, UUID, description, and various sorting options including CVSS score, EPSS score, and trending scores. Use this to find specific vulnerabilities, discover trending threats, or analyze vulnerability patterns. Returns comprehensive vulnerability data including: CVE ID, description, CVSS scores (base score, version, vector, source, full CVSS data array), EPSS score and percentile, CISA KEV status, publication dates, AI-generated fields (description, display name, CWE ID, impact assessment, mitigations, remediation), and trending metrics (1d, 7d, 30d).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sortNoField to sort results by (default: published_at)published_at
limitNoMaximum number of results to return
orderNoSort order: ascending or descending (default: desc)desc
filterNoFilter query. Prefixes: 'cve:' for CVE ID, 'uuid:' for UUID, 'desc:' for description, 'gen_description:' for generated description, 'gen_name:' for generated name. No prefix defaults to description search.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden; it does well on output shape by enumerating the returned fields (CVE, CVSS, EPSS, KEV, AI fields, trending windows) and on sort behavior (default published_at, trending 1d/7d/30d). It is silent on the safety profile (that it is a read-only operation), on authentication/rate limits, and on result-window behavior beyond the limit cap, which are the main behavioral gaps.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and filtering capability, then use cases, then payload. The long return-field enumeration is lengthy but defensible given there is no output schema; no sentence is pure filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Since there is no output schema, the detailed return-value list is necessary and present, and the filter/sort behavior is covered. Missing only operational context (read-only nature, auth, pagination semantics) for a zero-required-parameter search tool, which is a modest gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and even documents the filter prefix syntax, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description adds some semantic mapping by naming filter targets (CVE ID, UUID, description) and sort metrics (CVSS, EPSS, trending), but contributes no format or syntax detail beyond what the schema already provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Search and filter vulnerabilities') and adds scope details (filter fields, sort fields, result payload). It never names or rules out the obvious siblings listVulnerabilities/getVulnerability, so the agent must infer which retrieval tool to pick.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives three concrete use cases ('find specific vulnerabilities, discover trending threats, or analyze vulnerability patterns') that map cleanly onto the sort/filter parameters. It provides no when-not conditions and no explicit pointer to listVulnerabilities vs getVulnerability, so routing is clear but not exclusive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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