Limitguard Lead Verification

get_compliance_report

Per-entity report built from one real check.

        Registry identity, sanctions and PEP screens, domain signals, risk score
        with the rules that fired, correlations, every finding as a ranked action, a per-source
        status table (ok / unavailable / error) and a report hash.

        Args:
            entity_name: Full legal name (with country; omit when sending check_id)
            country: ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code
            kvk_number: Optional Dutch KVK number (8 digits)
            cbe_number: Optional Belgian CBE number (0XXX.XXX.XXX or 10 digits)
            vat_number: Optional EU VAT number
            domain: Optional company website domain
            iban: Optional IBAN (never stored raw)
            wallet_address: Optional crypto wallet address (format check only)
            wallet_chain: Optional chain for wallet_address (eth, base, btc, sol, ...)
            check_id: Id of a check from an earlier report, instead of identifiers

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`iban`	No
`domain`	No
`country`	No
`check_id`	No
`cbe_number`	No
`kvk_number`	No
`vat_number`	No
`entity_name`	No
`wallet_chain`	No
`wallet_address`	No

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`result`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 11, 2026

TDQS

A4/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, and the description coherently explains why: the report is 'built from one real check', which is a state-changing, non-idempotent external operation. It also adds behavioral detail the annotations cannot carry, notably 'never stored raw' for IBAN and a per-source status table covering ok/unavailable/error, so the agent knows results can be partial.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and report contents are front-loaded ahead of the argument list, and the argument block is necessary given 0% schema coverage, so nothing is wasted. The raw docstring-style indentation is slightly awkward but does not impede parsing.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, yet the description duplicates much of that content while also fully documenting all 10 parameters. The one missing piece is explicit sibling routing guidance, but for a complex 10-parameter tool the definition is otherwise complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and all 10 parameters are optional, so the description carries the full documentation burden and does so well: it gives formats (ISO 3166-1 alpha-2, 8-digit KVK, Belgian CBE pattern, EU VAT), constraints (IBAN never stored raw, wallet address format-check only), example chain values, and the check_id-versus-identifiers relationship.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: it produces a per-entity compliance report and enumerates exactly what the report contains (registry identity, sanctions/PEP screens, risk score, findings, source status table, hash). It is clearly distinguished in kind from atomic siblings like get_risk_score or sanctions_screen, though it never names an alternative sibling.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied rather than stated: the entity_name note ('omit when sending check_id') tells the agent the two input paths are mutually exclusive, which is a genuine routing hint. However, there is no guidance on when to call this full report versus the lighter siblings (check_entity, get_risk_score, sanctions_screen), which an agent would plausibly be choosing between.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Limitguard Lead Verification tools Inspect

Try in Browser

One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.