Skip to main content
Glama

Last Price

approve_payout_run

Destructive

Approve a payout run that is awaiting approval, and pay it: one Stripe Connect transfer per connected account, each with an idempotency key so a retry never pays twice. Never by the requester: whoever requested the run (the same API key or agent, or the same person through another of their keys, their sign-in or an agent they created) is refused with 403, so a run your own credential requested needs another person, or an agent a different person created, to approve it. Refused with nothing paid: 503 while Stripe is not ready for payouts, 409 when the run is not awaiting approval or the ledger changed since the request (the run becomes stale; request it again). Payouts run in Stripe test mode, so no real money moves until Last Price switches live payouts on. Answers 404 while payout runs are not switched on for your workspace (list_payout_runs says so in execution.enabled). Needs a Last Price credential with billing write scope. Needs a claimed workspace: a sandbox key from self-registration is refused (403) until a person claims the workspace.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
run_idYesThe payout run: id on a list_payout_runs or request_payout_run result.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructive/openWorld annotations: segregation-of-duties with 403 for the requester (including same-person-via-another-key), 503/409/404 refusal semantics with 'nothing paid' guarantees, staleness behavior, test-mode money movement, required billing write scope, and the unclaimed-workspace restriction. This is exactly the operational context an agent needs before a destructive financial action.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and its settlement effect are front-loaded, and every subsequent clause carries real information (auth, refusal codes, mode, scope). It is a single dense paragraph that could be broken up for scanning, but nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, open-world, no-output-schema tool with one parameter, the description covers preconditions, authorization, failure modes, side effects, and environment. An agent could call it correctly and interpret refusals without further lookup.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single run_id parameter is already documented as coming from list_payout_runs or request_payout_run. The description adds no further syntax or sourcing detail beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a precise verb+resource+effect: approve an awaiting payout run and pay it via one Stripe Connect transfer per connected account. This clearly separates it from request_payout_run, reject_payout_run, and retry_payout_run, which appear in the sibling list.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

States the precondition (run must be awaiting approval), the actor constraint (never the requester), and points to list_payout_runs' execution.enabled to check availability. It does not explicitly name reject_payout_run or retry_payout_run as alternatives, so routing between siblings is left partly implicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources