Skip to main content
Glama

Execute authorized work

execute
DestructiveIdempotent

Execute authorized provider work through InfraPulse. Requires a stable request_id and canonical authorization_id; may consume prepaid credits and change an external provider system.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
taskNo
inputNo
agent_idNo
metadataNo
request_idYesStable idempotency key for this mutating operation.
provider_idNo
provider_intentNo
timeout_secondsNo
authorization_idYesCanonical authorization returned by the authorize step.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okNo
dataNo
errorNo
intentNo
statusNo
receiptNo
successNo
request_idNo
next_actionNo
operation_idNo
requires_humanNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed5 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Previous value: -trueNew value: +false
    • addedInput schema / anyOf
      Added value: +[
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "task"
      +    ]
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "input"
      +    ]
      +  }
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / authorization_id / minLength
      Added value: +1
    • removedInput schema / properties / payload
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Optional canonical InfraPulse payload; direct top-level fields are also accepted.",
      -  "type": "object"
      -}
    • addedInput schema / properties / task / minLength
      Added value: +1
  2. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint, openWorldHint, and idempotentHint, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds value beyond that by disclosing real-world cost (may consume prepaid credits) and the fact that it mutates an external provider system — exactly the kind of consequence-an-agent-should-know context that annotations alone don't convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two compact clauses with the scope and prerequisites front-loaded and no filler. It could be tightened slightly, but every sentence carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Output schema exists and annotations are rich, so return values and safety are covered. However, for a 9-parameter, open-world, destructive mutation tool with 22% schema coverage, the description omits too much about parameter intent and the task/input contract to be considered complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 22% across 9 parameters, so the description must compensate and does not: it names request_id and authorization_id but adds nothing beyond their schema descriptions, and leaves task, input, provider_id, provider_intent, agent_id, metadata, and timeout_seconds entirely unexplained in either place. The agent cannot tell from the definition how task/input differ or how provider selection works.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb (execute) and a resource (authorized provider work) and ties the tool to the authorize-then-execute workflow by requiring an authorization_id. The resource is still abstract — 'provider work' doesn't tell the agent what domains or task types are valid, which is a gap given the generic sibling name 'execute'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states a hard prerequisite (a canonical authorization_id from the authorize step), which implies this runs only after authorization. There is no explicit guidance on when not to use it, how it relates to siblings like quote or verify_receipt, or what to do if authorization is missing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources