Skip to main content
Glama
This connector has been deprecated

This was a duplicate manual listing. Use Summer’s official listing, imported from the official MCP Registry. Summer’s MCP server remains active at https://api.gosummer.ai/mcp. Setup and documentation: https://gosummer.ai/docs/mcp-clients.

Create, update, rotate or disable a signed webhook endpoint

summer_webhooks_save
Destructive

Create, update, rotate or disable a signed webhook endpoint. A new signing secret goes to the trusted local helper only. Returns a local CLI command when a secret is involved.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYes
companyYesSummer company ID
disableNo
webhookYes
environmentYesEnvironment that owns the resource
event_typesYes
rotate_secretNo
idempotency_keyNoReuse the same key when retrying the same change
expected_versionYesCurrent version you expect; 0 when the resource does not exist yet

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructive=true, openWorld=true, idempotent=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely new behavior: the new signing secret is delivered to a trusted local helper rather than returned, and a local CLI command is returned when a secret is involved — crucial for an agent that might otherwise expect the secret in the payload.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, zero filler, with the operation set front-loaded and the secret-handling caveat immediately after. Every sentence carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 9-parameter destructive mutation with no output schema and sub-50% schema coverage, the description covers the secret/CLI return behavior well but omits the semantics of half the parameters and any guidance on optimistic-concurrency failure. Annotations carry the safety burden, which keeps this at a minimum-viable level rather than lower.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 44% across 9 parameters, so the description must compensate and does not. It never explains disable, event_types, expected_version semantics (optimistic concurrency, 0 for new resources), or idempotency_key, even though the idempotentHint=false annotation makes the latter non-obvious.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names the specific resource (signed webhook endpoint) and enumerates the four operations it performs — create, update, rotate, disable — which cleanly separates it from summer_webhooks_list and summer_webhooks_replay. It does not explicitly name those siblings, but the resource/operation combination is unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description lists the operations but never says when to choose this tool versus webhooks_replay or webhooks_list, nor what preconditions apply (e.g. expected_version=0 for creation). The mode selection is left entirely implicit in the disable/rotate_secret flags.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources