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Funkel AI

send_conversation_reply

Destructive

Send one exact prepared reply to the latest inbound message after explicit human approval. Provide the complete prepare_conversation_reply result, its attachment_id when present, and a stable request_key. A timeout is uncertain and cannot be retried automatically. LinkedIn files are supported; email files are unavailable. Over MCP: call this tool once, without confirmation_token. It runs right away and returns the result.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
preparedYesExact prepare_conversation_reply result; all fields required by server validation
request_keyYesStable unique request identity, 8-128 chars
attachment_idNoExact prepared file ID when present (UUID format, e.g. 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000)
confirmation_tokenNoOne-use approval token; omit on first call
reply_as_confirmedNoExplicitly confirm using another rep's sender

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false; the description goes further by explaining why retries are unsafe (uncertain timeout) and by disclosing file-capability asymmetry (LinkedIn supported, email unavailable). The approval requirement and immediate-execution-over-MCP behavior are additional context not present in the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core action and prerequisite, then layers constraints in short sentences; every sentence carries information. Slightly dense with four distinct ideas (approval, inputs, timeout, file support) but no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent write with no output schema, the description covers prerequisites, inputs, failure semantics, and capability limits. It stops short of describing the returned payload structure, though 'returns the result' is a reasonable signal given there is no output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns extra credit by explaining the relationship between 'prepared' and the prepare_conversation_reply output, when attachment_id applies ('when present'), and the purpose of request_key as a stable identity. It does not add field-level validation detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a precise verb and resource ('Send one exact prepared reply to the latest inbound message') and explicitly names the upstream sibling artifact (prepare_conversation_reply result), so the agent can distinguish it from the many other conversation/lead tools. The gating condition (after explicit human approval) further narrows the intent.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states the precondition (explicit human approval), what to supply (complete prepare result, attachment_id when present, stable request_key), and the MCP-specific invocation rule ('call this tool once, without confirmation_token'). It also warns that a timeout is uncertain and non-retryable, which directly shapes correct usage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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