elaichi__member__offboarding
Preview what removing a member would break, without changing anything: their personal connections and, per connection, which toolboxes reference it and whether that reference reaches beyond the member. Any connection marked needs_resolution will make member.delete refuse. Separately, delegated_entries lists entries on OTHER members’ toolboxes whose pin currently rides on THIS member’s own "use" grant, not their ownership (docs/access-model.md §6) — non-blocking, and member.delete never refuses over it, but say so: once the member is gone those entries go unmet for everyone until somebody with their own "use" on the connection re-pins them; there is no operation that does that automatically. synthetic_tools lists the multi-step tools they own, as metadata only (name, description, step_count — never the steps, which are private to their author): those cannot be shared or transferred, so every one of them is deleted when the member is removed, and their presence makes member.delete refuse outright — say what will be lost before proposing a removal. toolboxes and templates list what they own of each, with a bounded shared_with rollup (counts plus at most five named grantees, never the whole grant list) and an entry_count: only a resource’s OWNER can transfer or delete it, so one left behind when its owner goes becomes unmanageable by everybody in the organization forever — a shared one keeps working for its grantees with nobody able to change it, a private one simply becomes unreachable. Their presence also makes member.delete refuse. Returns { user_id, user: { id, name, email }, connections: [{ connection, referenced_by: [...], needs_resolution }], synthetic_tools: [{ synthetic_tool: { id, name, description, step_count, ... }, referenced_by: [...], needs_resolution }], toolboxes: [{ resource_type, id, name, entry_count, private, shared_with: { team_count, user_count, total, preview }, needs_resolution }], templates: [ ...same shape ], delegated_entries: [{ toolbox_id, toolbox_name, entry_id, connector_slug, tool_name, connection_id }] } directly — no envelope, no cursors. Sensitive read: returns records an operator treats as confidential (audit history, credential metadata, offboarding detail). Read-only, but not harmless — do not echo the contents further than needed.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The member’s USER id (`usr_…`) from member.list. |