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elaichi__access_request__resolve

Approve or deny a pending access request that SOMEONE ELSE filed. Needs member:manage, and refuses (403) a request the caller filed themselves however many permissions they hold — a decision is a record that a second person reviewed the ask, and one signed by its own requester reads downstream exactly like one that was not. An admin who no longer needs what they asked for uses access_request.withdraw on their own row instead. THIS RECORDS A DECISION — IT DOES NOT GRANT ANYTHING, with one exception that is the reason this is refused here: approving a reason:"restriction" request in the Elaichi web app now actually LIFTS the restriction it names, and restrictions are read-only on this surface (see restriction.list), so that must never happen by the back door. Approving a reason:"permission" request only sets this request’s own status and an optional note back to the requester; the requester’s role and restrictions are completely untouched, and nothing about what they can call changes because of this call. To actually widen what they can do, follow up with member.set_roles or the restriction APIs. Refuses (error) a request that has already left "pending" — a decision is recorded once. Returns the resolved request. NOT CALLABLE FROM ANY AI SURFACE, in-app agent or MCP: this needs step-up reauthentication (confirming it is really you), which neither surface can ask for, so every call from here is refused — denials included, since the gate is on the route and not on the decision. Say what needs doing and tell the user to do it in Governance → Access requests in the Elaichi app.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesAccess request id (`areq_…`) from access_request.list. Must be somebody else’s request — a row whose `can_resolve` is false is either already decided or your own, and both are refused.
noteNoOptional note back to the requester explaining the decision.
decisionYesThe decision to record. Not "withdrawn" — only the requester can withdraw their own request.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the sparse annotations (readOnlyHint false, destructiveHint false) to disclose that the call records a decision rather than granting access, that it refuses self-filed requests, that it errors on already-resolved requests, and that it is blocked at the route for AI callers due to reauthentication requirements. It even explains the one dangerous exception (approving a restriction request) and why it's refused. No contradiction with annotations; the description adds substantial behavioral context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense and long, covering many edge cases and security warnings. It front-loads the core purpose and then layers constraints. While every sentence earns its place given the complexity, the verbosity hurts scanability; a tighter structure with bullet points or a clearer separation of 'what it does' vs. 'what it doesn't' would improve it. It is appropriately sized for the context but not concise.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool that is effectively uncallable from AI surfaces, the description fully prepares the agent: it states the return value (the resolved request), the exact failure modes, and the proper user-facing alternative. Given the lack of an output schema, the description supplies the necessary behavioral contract. Nothing an agent needs to handle this tool correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description enriches parameters beyond the schema: it clarifies that 'id' must be somebody else's request and that a row with can_resolve=false will be refused, explains that 'note' is an optional reply to the requester, and clarifies that 'decision' cannot be 'withdrawn' because only the requester can withdraw. This adds actionable meaning to each field.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a clear verb-resource pair ('Approve or deny a pending access request') and immediately scopes it to requests filed by someone else, which differentiates it from the sibling access_request.withdraw (own requests) and the read-only get/list tools. The statement 'THIS RECORDS A DECISION — IT DOES NOT GRANT ANYTHING' crisply disambiguates its effect from permission-granting tools like member.set_roles.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to use (deciding someone else's request) and when not (own request → withdraw), and names the exact alternative. It also flatly declares the tool is NOT CALLABLE FROM ANY AI SURFACE and instructs the agent to redirect the user to the app, so the agent knows it should never invoke it. This is definitive usage guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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