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Switch to per-person credentials

set_datasource_credential_mode
DestructiveIdempotent

Make each person bring their own credentials to a service datasource: credential_mode per_user is the only value. People who have not connected theirs are asked to before their next run. A shared sign-in that records no person is removed; each person, you included, then connects their own. An administrator shares one account with every user from the datasource page in Admin, never through MCP. For a Custom datasource running on a card's connection, this changes only the credentials it declares itself; the card's connection changes on the card. A credential never passes through this conversation. Requires an Administrator and the project's datasource-management grant.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "datasource_id": "<datasource_id>",
      "credential_mode": "<credential_mode>"
    },
    "name": "set_datasource_credential_mode"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
datasource_idYesThe service datasource UUID
credential_modeYesper_user: each person brings their own credentials. Sharing one account with every user is chosen on the datasource page in Admin

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Well beyond the annotations, it discloses exactly what is destroyed ('A shared sign-in that records no person is removed'), the consequence for members (they are prompted before their next run), the scoping caveat for Custom datasources running on a card's connection, and the security guarantee that credentials never pass through the conversation. It also states the required authorization (Administrator plus the project's datasource-management grant).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action is front-loaded in the first sentence, and each subsequent sentence carries distinct information (member impact, destruction of shared sign-in, admin alternative, Custom-datasource caveat, auth requirement). It runs slightly long and packs multiple clauses per sentence, which costs a little readability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, permission-gated mutation with only two fully documented parameters and no output schema, the description covers side effects, prerequisites, downstream user behavior, and edge cases. An agent has everything needed to call it and to warn the user beforehand.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the enum is documented, so the baseline is 3; the description earns extra credit by explaining that per_user is the sole accepted value and what that value operationally implies for existing shared credentials. It adds meaning about consequences rather than restating the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence names the concrete action (switch a datasource to per-user credentials) and the target resource (a service datasource), and pins the only legal mode value. It also implies the boundary from admin-side sharing, though it never names a sibling tool directly, so it stops just short of explicit sibling differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states the condition for using it (each person brings their own credentials) and steers agents away from doing shared-account setup here: 'An administrator shares one account with every user from the datasource page in Admin, never through MCP.' The exclusions are clear, though it does not contrast with connect_datasource or update_service_datasource.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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