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Set which Roles can open a Hosted App

set_app_access
DestructiveIdempotent

Replace the Roles that may open a Hosted App. All Administrators always have access; [] permits Administrators only. End users and Administrator cannot be listed. Any Administrator may manage any app. Sharing grants the current version's recorded Requests to these Roles everywhere, including MCP and the Data API. It never grants the version's calls_without_grant. The built-in Member Role is everyone in this Project, including anyone invited later, so MCP cannot add it: a call whose role_ids adds Member is refused with member_share_requires_confirmation and a human_link to the Application page, where an Administrator confirms it; give the person that link. A list that keeps a saved Member share is not refused. Pass preview: true to see what the save would do without changing anything: changed, access_changes, and the Member refusal when it applies. Returns changed and access_changes for Roles whose reach grew; each added_requests entry carries changes_data: true when the Request can change data (any effect but READ). When role_ids names a Role and seat-taking invitations are restricted, the result carries invitation_eligibility, the same note list_users reports, including upgrade_url, and the share still succeeds. [] permits Administrators only and carries no such note. An offer Central did not confirm is not that restriction.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "role_ids": "<role_ids>"
    },
    "name": "set_app_access"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
slugNoApp slug; provide exactly one of slug or app_id
app_idNoApp UUID; provide exactly one of slug or app_id
previewNotrue answers what this save would do — changed, access_changes and any Member refusal — and writes nothing; omitted or false saves
role_idsYesRole UUIDs; [] permits Administrators only; End users and Administrator cannot be listed

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, and the description goes well beyond that by disclosing the blast radius: sharing grants the current version's recorded Requests to those Roles "everywhere, including MCP and the Data API," while never granting calls_without_grant. It also names the exact failure code (member_share_requires_confirmation) and the accompanying human_link, clarifies that a saved Member share is not refused, and warns that an unconfirmed Central offer is not the seat restriction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and scope are front-loaded, which is good, but the text is a dense block that repeats "[] permits Administrators only" twice and closes with the cryptic line "An offer Central did not confirm is not that restriction." Each clause carries information, but the ordering is hard to scan and the repetition costs it.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers everything an agent needs: what is replaced, the Administrator invariant, the empty-list case, preview behavior, the Member refusal and its human escalation path, and the shape of the response (changed, access_changes, added_requests with changes_data, invitation_eligibility). Nothing material is left to inference.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real semantics on top: what [] means for role_ids, why Member cannot be passed by MCP, what preview: true actually returns, and how seat-taking restrictions surface as invitation_eligibility with upgrade_url. Only the slug/app_id pair gets no extra treatment beyond the schema's own "provide exactly one" note.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: "Replace the Roles that may open a Hosted App," with the scope of the replacement (full replacement of the role set) made explicit. It is clearly distinguishable from siblings like add_role_members or set_role_requests because it operates on who may open the app, not on membership or request permissions.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives rich conditional guidance: [] means Administrators only, End users and Administrator cannot be listed, and preview: true answers "what the save would do" without writing. It also spells out the Member-role refusal path and tells the caller to hand the human_link to the person. It stops short of naming sibling tools to use instead for membership or request changes, so it is clear context rather than full when/when-not routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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