Dutify

fr_set_bug_visibility

Destructive

Toggle a bug's public visibility. Security bugs stay private regardless. API-key scope: feedback:bugs:write.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "shortId": "<shortId>",
      "isPublic": "<isPublic>"
    },
    "name": "fr_set_bug_visibility"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`account`	No	Multi-account auth only: name of the account from X-Dutify-Accounts to use for this call. Ignored in single-account mode (X-API-Key header). When multiple accounts are configured and this is omitted, the call fails with ACCOUNT_REQUIRED listing the available names. list_accounts never requires a selection.
`shortId`	Yes
`isPublic`	Yes
`workspace`	No	Workspace identifier or exact name for this call. Overrides the configured workspace. For personal keys, discover candidates with list_workspaces and select explicitly. Does not change other calls or expand a workspace key's access.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 24, 2026

TDQS

B3.4/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false, and openWorldHint=true, so the bar is lower. The description nonetheless adds genuinely non-obvious behavior — the security-bug invariant that overrides the caller's intent — and the required API-key scope (`feedback:bugs:write`), which is auth context the annotations do not carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short, front-loaded sentences with no filler; the action comes first, followed by the caveat, then the auth requirement. Only the backticked scope token is slightly noisy, but it carries real information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers purpose, one key invariant, and auth scope, but omits what happens when a security bug is targeted (silent no-op vs. error), whether related objects (comments, attachments, linked requests) change visibility, and how shortId is formatted. An agent could still call it, but not predict the outcome precisely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50%: shortId and isPublic have no descriptions in the schema, and the description provides no meaning for either. Worse, 'toggle' suggests flipping current state while the required isPublic boolean implies setting an explicit target state — the description leaves that ambiguity unresolved, so it adds nothing and mildly misleads.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Toggle a bug's public visibility,' so an agent immediately knows this mutates visibility state rather than status, assignee, or content. It doesn't explicitly contrast with siblings like fr_set_bug_status or fr_set_bug_assignee, but the resource-level distinction is clear enough.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is one real constraint — security bugs stay private regardless — which tells the agent this call may be a no-op for that class of bug. Beyond that there is no when-to-use guidance, no mention of prerequisites (e.g., ownership/moderation rights), and no named alternative for related visibility operations.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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