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DJZS Trust MCP

by ai.djzs
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Verify Prediction-Market Trade Thesis (DJZS pre-execution audit)

verify_pm_trade

Deterministic pre-execution audit of a prediction-market trade thesis, run before capital is committed. USE THIS TOOL before opening, sizing, or increasing any prediction-market position, and whenever a user or an upstream agent asks whether a thesis is sound, carries a falsification condition, or has a sourced probability basis. Audits against the calibrated DJZS-M taxonomy (M01 narrative/resolution gap, M02 falsification absent, M03 probability unsourced, M04 consensus-as-edge advisory) and returns PASS->PROCEED, WAIT->HALT, or FAIL with the flagged defects and a reproducible verdict_hash. DO NOT use to retrieve past verdicts or certificates - use query_pol_certificates for those. DO NOT use for an agent's historical trust score - use query_agent_trust for that. DO NOT use for spot, perpetuals, or equities: out-of-scope submissions are refused WITHOUT CHARGE. Audit before act. Paid tool: 2 USDC per audit via x402 on Base.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
intentYesFree-text prediction-market trade thesis to audit
agent_addressNoOptional agent wallet (0x). If set, this audit updates that agent's on-chain DJZS trust score
target_systemNoOptional agent/project identifier. Written to the certificate ONLY with a matching target_system_subject + target_system_signature; unsigned values are DISCARDED, not stored
target_system_subjectNoAddress that signed the target_system claim. Must be the address that recovers from target_system_signature
target_system_signatureNoEIP-191 personal_sign over "DJZS-TSC-1 target-system claim\nsubject: <lowercased subject>\ntarget_system: <value>"

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / target_system / description
      Previous value: -"Optional agent/project identifier; becomes the Target-System tag on the anchored PoL certificate"New value: +"Optional agent/project identifier. Written to the certificate ONLY with a matching target_system_subject + target_system_signature; unsigned values are DISCARDED, not stored"
    • addedInput schema / properties / target_system_signature
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "EIP-191 personal_sign over \"DJZS-TSC-1 target-system claim\\nsubject: <lowercased subject>\\ntarget_system: <value>\"",
+  "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{130}$",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / target_system_subject
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Address that signed the target_system claim. Must be the address that recovers from target_system_signature",
+  "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$",
+  "type": "string"
+}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With only a title annotation, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: deterministic audit, mapping of PASS/WAIT/FAIL to PROCEED/HALT, side effect of updating an on-chain trust score, reproducibility via verdict_hash, and a pricing/charge policy (2 USDC via x402, out-of-scope refused without charge). These are exactly the traits annotations do not provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose before the usage directives, and every clause carries information (alternatives, scope exclusions, price, outcomes). It is dense and slightly long with repeated DO NOT framing and the 'Audit before act' tagline, but nothing is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite having no output schema, the description explains the return contract (verdict, flagged defects, verdict_hash) and the failure modes, and it covers cost, scope, and side effects. An agent has everything needed to decide and call correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all five parameters including the signature format and the conditional storage rule for target_system. The description adds no parameter-level syntax or format detail, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (verify/audit), a specific resource (prediction-market trade thesis), and its timing constraint (pre-execution, before capital is committed). It also names the taxonomy used and the three verdict outcomes, so an agent can distinguish it from siblings without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit 'USE THIS TOOL before opening, sizing, or increasing any position' plus three named alternatives with their own triggers (query_pol_certificates for past verdicts, query_agent_trust for trust scores) and an explicit out-of-scope exclusion (spot/perp/equities). This is the full when/when-not/alternatives pattern.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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