Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and non-idempotency, but the description adds behavior the annotations cannot express: dependent access tokens stop authenticating, self-revocation breaks future calls, and the response is revoked=true. These are exactly the operational consequences an agent needs before invoking an irreversible action.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action, then scope, then consequences and return value. No filler or repetition; every clause conveys a distinct fact.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive mutation, the description covers the precondition, the cascade effect, the self-lockout hazard, and the return value even though no output schema exists. Nothing material is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single 'id' parameter is fully documented in the schema, so the description only echoes 'by ID'. Baseline 3 is appropriate since the schema carries the parameter meaning.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('revoke an owned service-principal credential by ID') and the scope ('owned service-principal'), which separates it cleanly from the sibling revoke_authority and revoke_webhook. An agent can identify the target object without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a clear precondition ('Requires credentials scope') and a critical usage caveat ('revoking the credential used for this call prevents later calls with it'). It does not explicitly name revoke_authority or revoke_webhook as alternatives for other object types, so the sibling routing is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.