Mint a new HMAC-SHA256 signing secret for a registered webhook endpoint. The previous secret is invalidated immediately - integrators must update their receiver before the next compel terminal event fires. Returns the new secret exactly once; store it on receipt.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| webhook_id | Yes | The webhook id to rotate the secret on |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the destructiveHint annotation, the description discloses critical behavior: 'The previous secret is invalidated immediately,' 'integrators must update their receiver before the next compel terminal event fires,' and 'Returns the new secret exactly once; store it on receipt.' These details are essential for safe use and go well beyond what annotations provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the primary purpose, and every clause adds value. It explains the action, the consequence (immediate invalidation), the urgency (update before next event), and the return behavior (one-time secret) with no redundant words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simple one-parameter schema, the destructiveHint annotation, and the absence of an output schema, the description is complete. It covers what happens, when to use it, what to expect in the return, and a critical warning. No additional context is needed for an agent to correctly select and invoke the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema fully documents the webhook_id parameter with a clear description ('The webhook id to rotate the secret on'), so schema coverage is 100%. The description adds the context 'for a registered webhook endpoint,' which slightly reinforces that the ID must refer to an existing registered webhook, but it does not add significant new parameter-level meaning.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description starts with 'Mint a new HMAC-SHA256 signing secret for a registered webhook endpoint,' which clearly states the action (mint/rotate), resource (webhook endpoint), and scope (signing secret). This distinguishes it from siblings like register_webhook, update_webhook, and delete_webhook by focusing specifically on secret rotation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is used to rotate a webhook's signing secret, and it provides clear context about the immediate invalidation and the need to update receivers. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use it or compare it to alternatives like update_webhook, so it lacks explicit exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Every tool targets a distinct action or resource. Groups like compels, lighting cues, webhooks, and account are clearly separated, and even similar tools (create_compel vs create_compel_from_music) have well-defined differences in input source.
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern with underscores (e.g., cancel_compel, launch_lighting_cue, register_webhook). No mixing of conventions or ambiguous verb choices.
With 30 tools, the server is above the 25+ threshold for 'too many'. While the scope includes multiple subdomains, the high number adds cognitive load and risks selection errors for an agent.
Core workflows are present (create, read, cancel, list, search, render), but missing update/delete for compels and media, and no way to modify render configuration beyond defaults.