resetPasswordActionReset password for a compute instance / resource referenced by an id - Reset password for a compute instance / resource referenced by an id. This will reset the current password to the password that you provided in the body of this request.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| instanceId | Yes | ||
| x-trace-id | No | ||
| x-request-id | Yes | ||
| resetPasswordActionBody | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Input schema / properties / x-hapi-auth-stateRemoved value: -{
- "type": "string"
-}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the agent knows this is a mutating operation. The description adds one concrete detail: it resets the current password to the password provided in the request body. This adds some context beyond the annotations, but it doesn't disclose irreversible consequences, required permissions, or other behavioral nuances.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is repetitive, repeating the title phrase twice ('Reset password for a compute instance / resource referenced by an id - Reset password for a compute instance / resource referenced by an id'). This wastes space and adds no new information. It could be significantly condensed into a single sentence.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is a destructive write operation with nested parameters and no output schema. The description is minimal, providing no information about return values, side effects, error conditions, or required authorization. For a potentially dangerous action, far more contextual detail is needed.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description provides no parameter details. The input schema does include descriptions for nested properties (e.g., rootPassword, sshKeys, userData), which partially helps, but the tool description itself offers no guidance on how the parameters relate to the action. The agent would need to rely entirely on the schema, which lacks top-level parameter descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action (reset password) and the target (a compute instance/resource by id). It uses a specific verb and resource, making the purpose understandable. However, it does not differentiate from the sibling tool 'resetPassword', which likely performs a similar or identical function, so the differentiation is unclear.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It does not mention any prerequisites, exclusions, or alternative tools. Given the existence of a closely named sibling 'resetPassword', the absence of any usage differentiation is a significant gap.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools have clearly distinct CRUD roles per resource, but there are several confusing overlaps: start/stop/restart/shutdown/rescue are similar lifecycle actions, and there are duplicate audit tools like retrieveImageAuditsList and retrieveImageAuditsList1 (one even mislabeled as DNS Zones audit). Additionally, retrieveTagAuditsList appears to duplicate retrieveAssignmentsAuditsList, and updateDnsZoneRecord incorrectly says 'Create resource record'. These overlaps and mislabeled descriptions make it hard to pick the right tool.
The naming is a mix of camelCase verb_noun patterns, but inconsistent. Some tools use 'retrieveXList' while others use 'listX', some use 'Cancel' with a capital letter, and 'tool_search' uses snake_case. Numeric suffixes like 'retrieveImageAuditsList1' and verbs like 'patchInstance' instead of 'updateInstance' further break consistency.
With 124 tools, this is an extremely large tool surface for an MCP server. Even for a broad cloud provider API, this overwhelms an agent's context and selection capabilities. The number far exceeds reasonable scoping and creates unnecessary selection overhead.
The tool set covers a wide range of resources thoroughly: instances, snapshots, images, private networks, object storage, DNS, domains, tags, roles, users, secrets, and audits. Most resources have create/retrieve/update/delete lifecycle operations, and there are extensive audit history tools. Minor gaps exist (e.g., no explicit instance deletion besides cancel, no separate firewall management beyond upgradeInstance), but overall the surface is quite complete for its domain.