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CloudBrowser

open_browser

Open one remote browser in the cloud with the connected CloudBrowser account. Use it only for websites and accounts that the user owns or is authorized to use, and follow their terms. Browsers open without stealth fingerprints.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
labelNoSpecifies the instance name, useful for recognizing it in the list of open remote desktops
browserNoBrowser type: 0 = Chrome, 2 = Chromium, 3 = ChromeHeadlessShell. Default 0
headlessNoIndicates whether the browser should open in headless mode (true) or with GUI (false). Default false
keepOpenNoSeconds of inactivity before browser closes automatically. Value 0 is never, default 300 seconds
saveSessionNoIf true, browser session is saved periodically and at the end, cookies and local storage, but not open tabs. Default false
recoverSessionNoIf true, loads the label when starting a previous session (if it exists), to know which session we save/restore. Default false

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / args
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "List of custom browser arguments. If null, default arguments will be used",
      -  "items": {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  "type": "array"
      -}
    • removedInput schema / properties / ignoredDefaultArgs
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "List of default arguments to ignore. If null, default ignored arguments will be used",
      -  "items": {
      -    "type": "string"
      -  },
      -  "type": "array"
      -}
    • removedInput schema / properties / stealth
      Removed value: -{
      -  "default": true,
      -  "description": "Enable or disable stealth mode. Default true",
      -  "type": "boolean"
      -}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds one genuine behavioral disclosure beyond annotations: browsers open without stealth fingerprints, and a CloudBrowser account must already be connected. With readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false already declared, the description leaves unaddressed resource-lifecycle behavior (auto-close on inactivity, session persistence) and what happens if the account is not connected.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the action, then the policy constraint, then a short disclosure. No redundancy or filler; the middle sentence is the longest but is doing real work.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With a fully documented schema and annotations covering safety hints, the description is nearly sufficient; the main residual gap is that no output schema exists and the description never indicates what opening returns (an instance label/id) or that follow-up tools like navigate_to_url operate on it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% with defaults and enum values documented for all six parameters, so the schema carries the semantics and baseline 3 applies. The description contributes nothing parameter-level, not even the fact that all parameters are optional or how label/saveSession/recoverSession interact.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Open one remote browser in the cloud") and adds the account binding ("connected CloudBrowser account"), which distinguishes it from connect_to_browser/start_remote_desktop conceptually. It never names a sibling or explicitly excludes alternatives, so an agent must infer the boundary with connect_to_browser and resume_saved_session.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The second sentence gives an acceptable-use constraint (only sites/accounts the user owns and authorized to use, follow terms), which is policy guidance rather than tool-selection guidance. There is no statement of when to pick this over connect_to_browser, resume_saved_session, or start_remote_desktop, so selection remains implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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