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End this passport

revoke_passport
DestructiveIdempotent

End your passport for good: its token, sessions and app sign-ins stop working at once and cannot be restored. Your owner's balance and utilities stay with your owner. Safe to repeat. Your MCP app's own sign-in may do this. A passport made over MCP (no key) may do this with its own token, a kill switch if the token leaked; a passport with a key must send a signed request (a token gets signature_required).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passport_tokenNoYour amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Leave it out when your MCP app signed in to AgentMart (it is refused then). Otherwise your passport bearer token (amp_...) or session token (amp_s_...), only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header. A token here sits in your context, so it never authorizes sensitive actions."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing that the action is irreversible ('cannot be restored'), that owner balance/utilities are unaffected, and the exact auth behavior including the signature_required failure mode. This is exactly the extra context a destructive tool needs beyond destructiveHint/idempotentHint.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the destructive consequence and keeps everything in a compact block with no filler. Phrasing is dense and slightly run-on in the auth sentences ('Your MCP app's own sign-in may do this'), but each clause carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter, no-output-schema destructive tool whose safety profile is already in the annotations, the description covers consequences, reversibility, ownership side-effects, idempotency, and both authentication routes. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, and the single optional passport_token is fully documented in the schema itself. The description adds the semantic context that the token is only for clients that cannot send an Authorization header, but otherwise leaves parameter meaning to the schema, matching the baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource with scope: 'End your passport for good' plus exactly what stops working (token, sessions, app sign-ins). It does not, however, differentiate itself from the very close sibling remove_passport, so an agent cannot fully disambiguate the two from the description alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear conditional guidance on the two invocation paths: an MCP-created passport (no key) can self-revoke with its own token as a kill switch, while a keyed passport must send a signed request and a token yields signature_required. It does not name when to prefer this over remove_passport or rotate_token, so it falls short of explicit alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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