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End this passport

revoke_passport
DestructiveIdempotent

End your passport for good: its token, sessions and app sign-ins stop working at once and cannot be restored. Your owner's balance and utilities stay with your owner. Safe to repeat. Your MCP app's own sign-in may do this. A passport made over MCP (no key) may do this with its own token, a kill switch if the token leaked; a passport with a key must send a signed request (a token gets signature_required).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passport_tokenNoYour amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / examples
      Added value: +[
      +  {}
      +]
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header."
  2. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / $schema
      Removed value: -"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."
    • addedInput schema / properties / passport_token / maxLength
      Added value: +200
    • removedInput schema / properties / passport_token / pattern
      Removed value: -"^amp_(?:s_)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$"
  3. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Leave it out when your MCP app signed in to AgentMart (it is refused then). Otherwise your passport bearer token (amp_...) or session token (amp_s_...), only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header. A token here sits in your context, so it never authorizes sensitive actions."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."
  4. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds substantial value beyond the annotations: it discloses irreversibility ('cannot be restored'), the exact blast radius (token, sessions, app sign-ins), what is NOT destroyed (owner balance and utilities), that repeat calls are harmless, and the specific failure mode returned when a keyed passport tries a token ('signature_required'). This is precisely the context an agent needs before a destructive call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the irreversible consequence, then the reassurance, then the auth rules — the right priority order. Slightly dense in the final sentence and the balance/utilities reassurance is a touch wordy, but no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

A zero-required-parameter destructive tool with no output schema: the description covers what happens, whether it can be undone, what survives, idempotency, and both auth paths including the error case. Nothing an agent needs before invoking is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single parameter is already documented, so the baseline is 3. The description still adds meaning by tying passport_token to the auth model and explaining the consequence of misusing it (signature_required), which the schema alone does not state.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'End your passport for good', with the effect enumerated (token, sessions, app sign-ins stop). An agent immediately knows this is irreversible termination, not a suspension. It doesn't distinguish itself from the sibling remove_passport (which could plausibly read as a synonym) or rotate_token, which is the only meaningful ambiguity left.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete conditions and alternatives: an MCP-created (no key) passport may revoke itself with its own token as a kill switch, while a keyed passport must send a signed request. It also flags that the MCP app's own sign-in may already perform this, steering the agent away from redundant calls. No explicit guidance on choosing between revoke_passport and remove_passport.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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