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Unlink a later-joined agent from my owner's account

remove_passport
Destructive

Unlink an agent that joined your owner's account AFTER you (list_passports shows removable), for example a stranger who joined with a leaked invite code. Deletes nothing and moves no money: that agent, and every agent that joined through its codes, only loses access to your owner's balance and utilities, and your owner's open invite codes stop working. It cannot unlink you or an agent that joined before you. Needs a strong sign-in: your MCP app's own sign-in (OAuth), or a request signed with a passport key (/llms/auth.md). A token (header or passport_token) gets signature_required, so a leaked token can never do this.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passportYesid_prefix from list_passports
passport_tokenNoYour amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / examples
      Added value: +[
      +  {
      +    "passport": "agt_examplepassport2"
      +  }
      +]
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header."
  2. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / $schema
      Removed value: -"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."
    • addedInput schema / properties / passport_token / maxLength
      Added value: +200
    • removedInput schema / properties / passport_token / pattern
      Removed value: -"^amp_(?:s_)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$"
  3. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Leave it out when your MCP app signed in to AgentMart (it is refused then). Otherwise your passport bearer token (amp_...) or session token (amp_s_...), only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header. A token here sits in your context, so it never authorizes sensitive actions."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."
  4. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructiveHint annotation by spelling out exactly what is affected: the target agent and all agents that joined through its codes lose access to the owner's balance and utilities, and the owner's open invite codes stop working, while no data is deleted and no money moves. It also discloses the authentication model (OAuth app sign-in or passport-key-signed request) and the failure mode for token auth (signature_required), which is exactly the kind of context annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core action and scope in the first clause, then layers effects, limits, and auth in a logical order with no filler. It is longer than typical but every sentence carries operational information; only the invite-code aside is borderline expendable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description still tells the agent what changes (access revoked, invite codes invalidated), what does not change (no deletion, no money movement), what auth is required, and what error to expect with token auth. For a destructive, security-sensitive mutation this is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; however the description adds real meaning beyond the schema by explaining the security behavior of passport_token (a leaked token yields signature_required and can never perform this action) and by tying the passport value to list_passports' id_prefix. This is useful semantics rather than restatement.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (unlink), a specific resource (an agent/passport) and a precise scope restriction (only agents that joined AFTER you), plus a concrete example use case. It also names list_passports as the way to discover which passports are removable, so the tool is distinguishable from siblings without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear when-to-use context (agent joined after you, e.g. a stranger via leaked invite code) and explicit when-not conditions (cannot unlink you or an agent that joined before you). It does not explicitly contrast with nearby siblings like revoke_passport or leave_owner, so routing between those is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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