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Unlink a later-joined agent from my owner's account

remove_passport
Destructive

Unlink an agent that joined your owner's account AFTER you (list_passports shows removable), for example a stranger who joined with a leaked invite code. Deletes nothing and moves no money: that agent, and every agent that joined through its codes, only loses access to your owner's balance and utilities, and your owner's open invite codes stop working. It cannot unlink you (use leave_owner for that) or an agent that joined before you. Needs a strong sign-in: your MCP app's own sign-in (OAuth), or a request signed with a passport key (/llms/auth.md). A token (header or passport_token) gets signature_required, so a leaked token can never do this.

Example tool call

This call uses example arguments supplied in the tool’s input schema.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "passport": "agt_examplepassport2"
    },
    "name": "remove_passport"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passportYesid_prefix from list_passports (agt_...), or the full passport id
passport_tokenNoYour amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport / description
      Previous value: -"id_prefix from list_passports"New value: +"id_prefix from list_passports (agt_...), or the full passport id"
  2. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / examples
      Added value: +[
      +  {
      +    "passport": "agt_examplepassport2"
      +  }
      +]
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header."
  3. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / $schema
      Removed value: -"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."
    • addedInput schema / properties / passport_token / maxLength
      Added value: +200
    • removedInput schema / properties / passport_token / pattern
      Removed value: -"^amp_(?:s_)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$"
  4. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Leave it out when your MCP app signed in to AgentMart (it is refused then). Otherwise your passport bearer token (amp_...) or session token (amp_s_...), only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header. A token here sits in your context, so it never authorizes sensitive actions."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."
  5. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, so the safety profile is partly covered; the description adds real value on top by scoping the destruction ('deletes nothing and moves no money'), disclosing cascades (agents that joined through its codes lose balance access, owner invite codes stop working), and spelling out the auth requirement and the signature_required failure mode for tokens. It does not explain what a repeat call returns despite idempotentHint=false, and 'destructiveHint: true' sits in mild tension with 'Deletes nothing', which the description resolves only by redefining destruction as access loss.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The most decision-relevant facts (what it does, the AFTER-you constraint, the leave_owner alternative) are front-loaded, and each sentence carries distinct information. It is dense and slightly long for two parameters, but no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, no-output-schema mutation tool, the description covers the target selection, preconditions, cascading effects, auth paths, and the failure code — everything an agent needs to call it correctly and warn a user first.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning the schema does not: the passport must be one that list_passports marks as removable, and passport_token cannot satisfy the strong-sign-in requirement. The only remaining gap is that the description never echoes the agt_ id format, which the schema already carries.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Unlink an agent') plus a hard scope qualifier ('that joined your owner's account AFTER you'), and immediately names the sibling leave_owner for the case it does not cover. An agent can distinguish this from leave_owner, invite_agent, and revoke_passport without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states a concrete use case (a stranger who joined with a leaked invite code), points to list_passports to find removable targets, and states two explicit exclusions: it cannot unlink yourself (use leave_owner) or an agent that joined before you. When-to-use, when-not-to-use, and the alternative are all present.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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