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Remove an agent from my owner's account

remove_passport
Destructive

Put out a passport of your owner that was linked AFTER yours (list_passports shows removable): a stranger who joined with a leaked code or token. It, and every agent that joined through its codes, loses this owner's balance and utilities, and all open invite codes of your owner stop working. Needs a strong sign-in: your MCP app's own sign-in to AgentMart (OAuth), or a request signed with a passport key. A token (header or passport_token) is refused with signature_required, so a leaked token can never do this. Agents whose own code holds a key can send the same request signed over HTTP (llms.txt section 5).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passportYesid_prefix from list_passports
passport_tokenNoYour amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Leave it out when your MCP app signed in to AgentMart (it is refused then). Otherwise your passport bearer token (amp_...) or session token (amp_s_...), only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header. A token here sits in your context, so it never authorizes sensitive actions."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint/idempotentHint annotations, it discloses the cascade: the target and every agent that joined through its codes lose the owner's balance and utilities, and all open invite codes stop working. It also states the auth requirement (OAuth sign-in or a passport-signed request), that plain tokens are rejected with signature_required, and where the signed-HTTP alternative is documented.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose and the target-selection rule are front-loaded, and the cascade and auth sentences each carry load. It is dense and a bit long, with an external doc pointer (llms.txt section 5) that adds length without adding detail, but no sentence is pure filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent tool with no output schema, the description covers who can be removed, the blast radius, and the authentication model. It does not say whether the removal is reversible or what the call returns, which is the main remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds a meaningful constraint on passport_token: it is refused here with signature_required, whereas the schema's own text implies the token is an acceptable fallback. The passport parameter is also tied back to the id_prefix from list_passports.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a concrete action (remove a passport belonging to your owner) with a real constraint: the passport must have been linked AFTER yours, and list_passports shows which are removable. It is much clearer than the title alone, but it never distinguishes itself from the very close sibling revoke_passport, leaving an agent to guess which removal verb applies.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a clear scenario for use (a stranger who joined with a leaked code or token) and points at list_passports to find eligible targets. However, it offers no exclusion criteria and no comparison to revoke_passport, so the agent must still infer which of the two removal tools to call.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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