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Set webhook inbox pro forwarding, signature checks and handshakes

inbox_pro_set
DestructiveIdempotent

Set your webhook inbox pro plan (instance_id: its ipr_ id; inbox_pro_get shows the settings first): inbox_instance_id (the inbox to upgrade; its address stays), forward, verify, handshakes. Fields left out stay; forward or verify null turns it off. Moving the plan to another inbox turns off verify, handshakes and forward unless this call sets them again. A forward url must prove it is yours by answering our check POST. The forwarding key comes back once, as forward_secret: keep it to check our forwards; rotate_forward_secret replaces it.

Example tool call

This call uses example arguments supplied in the tool’s input schema.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "verify": {
        "preset": "github",
        "secret": "example-secret"
      },
      "instance_id": "ipr_exampleexampleexample2",
      "inbox_instance_id": "inb_exampleexampleexample2"
    },
    "name": "inbox_pro_set"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
verifyNoSender signature check; null turns it off.
forwardNoWhere to forward every message; null turns it off.
handshakesNoAnswer the Slack, Zoom or Meta URL checks.
instance_idYesUtility instance id from buy or list_utilities.
passport_tokenNoYour amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header.
inbox_instance_idNoThe inbox to upgrade (one of yours).
rotate_forward_secretNotrue: a new forwarding key (returned once).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed6 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / examples
      Added value: +[
      +  {
      +    "inbox_instance_id": "inb_exampleexampleexample2",
      +    "instance_id": "ipr_exampleexampleexample2",
      +    "verify": {
      +      "preset": "github",
      +      "secret": "example-secret"
      +    }
      +  }
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / handshakes / properties / meta_verify_token / description
      Added value: +"Answer Meta's GET hub.challenge when hub.verify_token equals this (8 to 256 characters). null turns it off."
    • addedInput schema / properties / handshakes / properties / slack / description
      Added value: +"Answer Slack's url_verification (needs verify preset slack)."
    • addedInput schema / properties / handshakes / properties / zoom / description
      Added value: +"Answer Zoom's endpoint.url_validation (needs verify preset zoom)."
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if you have no app sign-in and cannot send a header."
    • changedInput schema / properties / verify / anyOf
      Previous value: -[
      -  {
      -    "additionalProperties": false,
      -    "properties": {
      -      "algorithm": {
      -        "enum": [
      -          "sha256",
      -          "sha512",
      -          "sha1"
      -        ],
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "encoding": {
      -        "enum": [
      -          "hex",
      -          "base64"
      -        ],
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "forward_only_verified": {
      -        "description": "true: forward only messages whose signature verified; the rest stay in the inbox (forward status skipped, not_verified).",
      -        "type": "boolean"
      -      },
      -      "header": {
      -        "description": "hmac only: the signature header.",
      -        "maxLength": 100,
      -        "minLength": 1,
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "prefix": {
      -        "maxLength": 20,
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "preset": {
      -        "enum": [
      -          "github",
      -          "stripe",
      -          "slack",
      -          "zoom",
      -          "hmac"
      -        ],
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "reject_unverified": {
      -        "type": "boolean"
      -      },
      -      "secret": {
      -        "description": "The sender's signing secret (stored encrypted, never shown).",
      -        "maxLength": 256,
      -        "minLength": 1,
      -        "type": "string"
      -      }
      -    },
      -    "required": [
      -      "preset",
      -      "secret"
      -    ],
      -    "type": "object"
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "type": "null"
      -  }
      -]New value: +[
      +  {
      +    "additionalProperties": false,
      +    "properties": {
      +      "algorithm": {
      +        "description": "hmac only, default sha256.",
      +        "enum": [
      +          "sha256",
      +          "sha512",
      +          "sha1"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "encoding": {
      +        "description": "hmac only, default hex.",
      +        "enum": [
      +          "hex",
      +          "base64"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "forward_only_verified": {
      +        "description": "true: forward only messages whose signature verified; the rest stay in the inbox (forward status skipped, not_verified).",
      +        "type": "boolean"
      +      },
      +      "header": {
      +        "description": "hmac only: the signature header.",
      +        "maxLength": 100,
      +        "minLength": 1,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "prefix": {
      +        "description": "hmac only: text before the signature, for example \"sha256=\".",
      +        "maxLength": 20,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "preset": {
      +        "description": "The sender: github, stripe, slack or zoom, or hmac for any other sender that signs with HMAC.",
      +        "enum": [
      +          "github",
      +          "stripe",
      +          "slack",
      +          "zoom",
      +          "hmac"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "reject_unverified": {
      +        "description": "true: a message that fails is refused with 401 and not stored.",
      +        "type": "boolean"
      +      },
      +      "secret": {
      +        "description": "The sender's signing secret (stored encrypted, never shown).",
      +        "maxLength": 256,
      +        "minLength": 1,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "required": [
      +      "preset",
      +      "secret"
      +    ],
      +    "type": "object"
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "type": "null"
      +  }
      +]
  2. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / $schema
      Removed value: -"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedInput schema / properties / passport_token / description
      Previous value: -"Your amp_ token, only if your client cannot send it as an Authorization header; leave it out when your MCP app signed in."New value: +"Your amp_ token, only if your app has no sign-in and cannot send it as an Authorization header."
    • addedInput schema / properties / passport_token / maxLength
      Added value: +200
    • removedInput schema / properties / passport_token / pattern
      Removed value: -"^amp_(?:s_)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$"
  3. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / verify / anyOf
      Previous value: -[
      -  {
      -    "additionalProperties": false,
      -    "properties": {
      -      "algorithm": {
      -        "enum": [
      -          "sha256",
      -          "sha512",
      -          "sha1"
      -        ],
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "encoding": {
      -        "enum": [
      -          "hex",
      -          "base64"
      -        ],
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "header": {
      -        "description": "hmac only: the signature header.",
      -        "maxLength": 100,
      -        "minLength": 1,
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "prefix": {
      -        "maxLength": 20,
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "preset": {
      -        "enum": [
      -          "github",
      -          "stripe",
      -          "slack",
      -          "zoom",
      -          "hmac"
      -        ],
      -        "type": "string"
      -      },
      -      "reject_unverified": {
      -        "type": "boolean"
      -      },
      -      "secret": {
      -        "description": "The sender's signing secret (stored encrypted, never shown).",
      -        "maxLength": 256,
      -        "minLength": 1,
      -        "type": "string"
      -      }
      -    },
      -    "required": [
      -      "preset",
      -      "secret"
      -    ],
      -    "type": "object"
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "type": "null"
      -  }
      -]New value: +[
      +  {
      +    "additionalProperties": false,
      +    "properties": {
      +      "algorithm": {
      +        "enum": [
      +          "sha256",
      +          "sha512",
      +          "sha1"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "encoding": {
      +        "enum": [
      +          "hex",
      +          "base64"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "forward_only_verified": {
      +        "description": "true: forward only messages whose signature verified; the rest stay in the inbox (forward status skipped, not_verified).",
      +        "type": "boolean"
      +      },
      +      "header": {
      +        "description": "hmac only: the signature header.",
      +        "maxLength": 100,
      +        "minLength": 1,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "prefix": {
      +        "maxLength": 20,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "preset": {
      +        "enum": [
      +          "github",
      +          "stripe",
      +          "slack",
      +          "zoom",
      +          "hmac"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "reject_unverified": {
      +        "type": "boolean"
      +      },
      +      "secret": {
      +        "description": "The sender's signing secret (stored encrypted, never shown).",
      +        "maxLength": 256,
      +        "minLength": 1,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "required": [
      +      "preset",
      +      "secret"
      +    ],
      +    "type": "object"
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "type": "null"
      +  }
      +]
  4. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations (destructive=true, idempotent=true) by disclosing the concrete destructive side effect: retargeting an inbox turns off verify, handshakes and forward. It also reveals the out-of-band requirement that the forward URL must answer a verification POST, and that the forwarding key is returned only once as forward_secret — behavior an agent could not infer from structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and the settings being set, then layers on the consequential rules in roughly priority order. The prose is dense and telegraphic (semicolon-chained parentheticals) but nearly every clause carries a real constraint; only the parenthetical identity hints feel slightly redundant with the schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, nested, seven-parameter write tool with no output schema, the description covers the essential unknowns: what gets disabled on retarget, how to disable a feature, and the one-time forward_secret return value. It omits any discussion of error paths (e.g. failed ownership check) and the passport_token auth fallback, which is a modest gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents each property, but the description still adds value: it tags instance_id as the ipr_ id, clarifies that the inbox's address is unchanged on upgrade, and explains the null/omitted semantics in operational terms. handshakes and passport_token get no mention in the prose.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names the specific verb and resource ('Set your webhook inbox pro plan') and enumerates the exact facets controlled: forward, verify, handshakes. It also states the mutation is on an inbox identified by an ipr_ instance id, which distinguishes it from the read counterpart inbox_pro_get named right in the text.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Points to inbox_pro_get as the way to inspect settings first, and spells out the practical decision rules: fields left out stay, null turns a feature off, and moving the plan to another inbox silently disables verify/handshakes/forward unless re-specified. It stops short of explicitly stating when not to use this tool or naming rotate_forward_secret as a distinct path.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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