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Update security disposition

update_security_disposition
Destructive

Change a disposition policy's reason, review deadline or expire-when-fixed flag (security.manage). The selector and disposition cannot change - revoke and create instead. A revoked policy cannot be edited.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "policy_id": "<policy_id>"
    },
    "name": "update_security_disposition"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
reasonNoNew reason.
policy_idYesPolicy id (UUID) from list_security_dispositions.
expires_atNoNew review deadline as an RFC 3339 timestamp.
expire_when_fix_availableNoWhether the policy lapses once a fixed version exists.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=false and destructiveHint=true; the description adds value beyond them by disclosing the required permission scope (security.manage) and the immutability constraints (selector/disposition fixed, revoked policies locked). It does not explain why the operation is considered destructive - e.g. what expire_when_fix_available does when it lapses - nor whether edits are audited or reversible, leaving a gap relative to the destructive annotation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences with zero filler: what changes, what cannot change with the redirect, and the revoked-policy precondition. The mutable-field list and the alternative routing are both front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a four-parameter mutation with no output schema, the description covers purpose, permission, immutability and the revoked-policy precondition. It stops short of describing the response or what happens to fields left unspecified (partial vs full update), which matters for a non-idempotent destructive update.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters are already documented in the schema, and the description largely restates the same field set. It does add the meaningful constraint that these three are the ONLY mutable fields and that policy_id must come from list_security_dispositions (already in schema). Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (Change) and resource (a disposition policy) and enumerates the exact mutable fields: reason, review deadline, expire-when-fixed flag. It also explicitly carves out what this tool is not for - selector/disposition changes - pointing to revoke and create, so an agent can distinguish it from revoke_security_disposition and create_security_disposition without opening their schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear negative guidance: selector and disposition cannot be changed here (use revoke and create instead), and a revoked policy cannot be edited at all. That covers the main misuse cases. It does not mention preview_security_disposition as a validation step or state prerequisites beyond the security.manage permission, so it falls short of a full 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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