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Rotate secret

rotate_secret
Destructive

Rotate an organisation secret: Ankra generates a new value and replaces the old one in place, so the sentinel stays the same and every resource that uses the secret receives the new value on its next reconcile (resources on clusters without GitOps are re-applied straight away). The old value is gone. A workload that read the secret at start keeps the old value until it restarts. Needs the secrets.manage permission (organisation owners and admins). It never takes a value: a secret the person must type is replaced on the secrets page.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "name": "<name>"
    },
    "name": "rotate_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesThe secret's name as list_secrets shows it, or its ${SECRET_SLOT:<id>} sentinel.
lengthNoOptional length of the new value, 16 to 96 characters.
prefixNoOptional fixed text the new value starts with.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint=true annotation, the description discloses that the old value is gone, propagation happens on the next reconcile (or immediately without GitOps), running workloads keep the stale value until restart, and the secrets.manage permission is required. That is exactly the operationally relevant behavior an agent needs before invoking a destructive rotation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The mechanism is front-loaded and every clause is substantive, with no filler. Some sentences are dense and parenthetical, which slightly taxes scanning, but nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive one-shot mutation with no output schema, the definition covers permissions, effects on the stored value, propagation timing, and client-caching caveats. Nothing an agent needs before calling it is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents name, length, and prefix. The description adds meaning by explaining that the sentinel form of the name stays constant across rotation, but it does not elaborate on length or prefix beyond what the schema states. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb (rotate) and resource (organisation secret) and immediately explains the mechanism: a new value replaces the old in place, sentinel unchanged. That distinguishes it clearly from create_secret, request_secret, delete_secret, and get_secrets.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit usage boundaries: it never takes a value, and secrets a person must type are replaced on the secrets page, which routes the agent away from this tool for that case. It does not name sibling tools like request_secret or create_secret as alternatives, so it stops short of a full when/when-not map.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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