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revoke_security_disposition

Destructive

Revoke a disposition (security.manage): every finding it covered returns to open on the next read, and the disposition stays on record as revoked with the reason. For a repository_code disposition the Ankra Pipelines image gate blocks on the finding again from its next run. Use it when accepted risk is no longer acceptable or an acknowledgement or false-positive call was wrong.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scopeNorepository_code when policy_id is a code finding disposition; optional, since the id is recognised either way.
reasonYesWhy the policy is revoked. Required; recorded on the audit trail.
policy_idYesPolicy id (UUID) from list_security_dispositions, or a repository_code disposition id from list_security_dispositions with scope repository_code.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / policy_id / description
      Previous value: -"Policy id (UUID) from list_security_dispositions."New value: +"Policy id (UUID) from list_security_dispositions, or a repository_code disposition id from list_security_dispositions with scope repository_code."
    • addedInput schema / properties / scope
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "repository_code when policy_id is a code finding disposition; optional, since the id is recognised either way.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Significantly exceeds what the annotations provide. Beyond destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, it discloses the concrete consequences (covered findings reopen on next read), the persistence semantics (stays on record as revoked with the reason on the audit trail), the required permission (security.manage), and the downstream effect of the Ankra Pipelines image gate re-blocking on repository_code dispositions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the effect before the usage trigger. Each sentence carries information, though the Ankra Pipelines image-gate detail is fairly niche and could be trimmed without harming the core guidance.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers consequences, audit behavior, permission requirements, and the environment-specific gate effect — enough for an agent to act safely. It stops short of stating reversibility/undo behavior or how an already-revoked disposition is handled under idempotentHint=false.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents policy_id, reason, and scope. The description adds only marginal meaning beyond it (that the reason is recorded on the audit trail and that repository_code dispositions are recognised), which does not go far past what the schema states. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource (revoke a disposition) and immediately defines the observable effect: findings return to open and the disposition remains on record as revoked. It is clearly distinguishable in practice from update_security_disposition or create_security_disposition, though it never names those siblings to make the contrast explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit when-to-use trigger: 'Use it when accepted risk is no longer acceptable or an acknowledgement or false-positive call was wrong.' This is clear context for selection, but it does not state when NOT to use it or point to the alternative (e.g. update_security_disposition) for adjusting rather than revoking.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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