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List security SBOM image findings

list_security_sbom_image_findings
Read-only

List the vulnerabilities (CVEs) named on one image: one row per CVE and installed package version, with the fixed version when one exists, the CISA KEV listing and EPSS probability, how the occurrences are dispositioned, and how many workloads and clusters run it. Read-only. Works for an image with or without a bill of materials (image.sbom_status says which); an image the platform has never seen is refused. Identify the image by digest or by the repository:tag reference list_security_sbom_images or list_security_sbom_containers returns. Use get_security_finding for one CVE's full detail.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "image": "<image>"
    },
    "name": "list_security_sbom_image_findings"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pageNoPage number, starting at 1.
sortNoSort column: exploitability (default), severity, epss, cve_id, package_name, last_seen_at, occurrences.
imageYesThe image: a sha256 digest, or the repository:tag reference the inventory lists.
orderNoasc or desc.
searchNoMatch CVE id, package name or title.
page_sizeNoResults per page (default 50).
severitiesNoOnly these severities (critical, high, medium, low, unknown).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, and the description reinforces read-onlyness while adding non-obvious behavior: the refusal for unknown images, the fact that image.sbom_status governs whether an SBOM exists, and the fallback fixed version when present. It does not discuss pagination limits or rate behavior, which keeps it short of a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and row grain are front-loaded, then the returned fields, then the guardrail, then the sibling pointer — a sensible order with no filler. The first sentence runs long with a nested list of returned attributes, which costs a point on readability but not on substance.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only list tool with no output schema and seven parameters, the description supplies the missing return-shape information (CVE, package version, fixed version, CISA KEV, EPSS, disposition, workload and cluster counts) plus the input-sourcing and refusal cases. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real value beyond the schema by explaining where the required 'image' value comes from (digest or the repository:tag reference the inventory lists). Sort, order, search, page and severities are left entirely to the schema, which is acceptable at full coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('List the vulnerabilities (CVEs) named on one image') and immediately defines the row grain: one row per CVE plus installed package version. It is clearly distinguished from siblings by naming list_security_sbom_images, list_security_sbom_containers and get_security_finding with their respective roles.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit routing: use this for a per-image CVE list, use get_security_finding for a single CVE's full detail, and get the image identifier from the images/containers list tools. It also states the boundary condition that an image the platform has never seen is refused, and that images without a bill of materials are still supported.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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