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List security SBOM components

list_security_sbom_components
Read-only

List the packages the scanner found across the fleet's container images, grouped by name, version and ecosystem, with their declared licences and licence risk tier, how many images/workloads/clusters carry each one, and the findings naming that exact version. Use it to answer "where do we run this package", "which licences do we ship" or "which packages oblige us to publish source" without a rescan: every row carries license_risk and the facets.license_risk block counts components per tier. Filter by ecosystem, licence risk tier, cluster, namespace or a single image. Read-only. The inventory is opt-in per cluster: read the coverage block in the response before treating an absent package as one the fleet does not run.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "list_security_sbom_components"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pageNoPage number, starting at 1.
sortNoSort column.
imageNoOnly packages in this image (digest or repository:tag reference).
orderNoasc or desc.
searchNoMatch package name or package URL (purl).
namespaceNoOnly packages in images running in this namespace.
page_sizeNoResults per page (default 50).
cluster_idNoOnly packages in images running on this cluster (UUID).
vulnerableNoOnly packages a finding names (true), or only packages nothing names (false).
license_risksNoOnly these licence risk tiers: network_copyleft (AGPL, SSPL, EUPL, OSL - serving over a network obliges publishing the source that links it), source_available (BUSL, Elastic, Redis Source Available, Commons Clause - a managed service needs a commercial licence), copyleft (GPL - private backends are safe, shipped bundles must be open-sourced), weak_copyleft (LGPL, MPL, EPL, CDDL), permissive (MIT, Apache-2.0, BSD, ISC), unknown.
package_typesNoOnly these ecosystems (apk, deb, rpm, npm, pypi, golang, maven, ...).
workload_kindNoOnly images running in workloads of this kind (Deployment, StatefulSet, DaemonSet, CronJob, ...); case-insensitive.
workload_nameNoOnly images running in the workload with this name; case-insensitive. Combine with workload_kind to pin one workload.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

readOnlyHint already covers the safety profile, so the one-word "Read-only" adds nothing. The genuinely valuable addition is the warning that the inventory is opt-in per cluster and that the response's coverage block must be read before treating an absent package as genuinely absent — a non-obvious false-negative trap that no annotation could convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The opening sentence is front-loaded with the core purpose and the return shape, then use cases, then filters, then the caveat — a sensible order. It is dense but nearly every clause carries information; the only waste is the redundant "Read-only" and some restatement of fields already obvious from the schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With 13 optional parameters and no output schema, the description does the necessary work of describing the response shape (per-row license_risk, facets.license_risk tier counts, coverage block) and warns about the opt-in data gap. Pagination and sorting behavior are left entirely to the schema, which is acceptable but the only remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema itself already explains the licence risk tiers in detail, so the description's filter list (ecosystem, licence risk tier, cluster, namespace, single image) is largely a restatement. It does not clarify combinations or precedence among the 13 optional filters. Baseline 3 applies when the schema carries the semantics.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a precise verb and resource — list the packages the scanner found across the fleet's container images — and specifies the aggregation grain (name, version, ecosystem), plus the payload (licences, licence risk tier, image/workload/cluster counts, findings on that exact version). It is unmistakable what the tool returns, though it never names the adjacent siblings (list_security_sbom_images, list_security_sbom_containers, get_security_sbom_component) that an agent would need to differentiate against.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It supplies concrete question-shaped use cases ("where do we run this package", "which licences do we ship", "which packages oblige us to publish source") and states the value proposition of avoiding a rescan. It does not state when NOT to use it or point at the alternative tool for image-level or container-level questions, so the routing burden remains partly on the agent.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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