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list_security_findings

Read-only

List the organisation's security findings (CVEs across every scanned cluster), exploited-in-the-wild first, with CISA KEV and EPSS exploitation intelligence, affected clusters/workloads, and fixability. Filter by severity, status, fixable, known_exploited, cluster, add-on or namespace; search by CVE id or package. Read-only. Drill into one finding with get_security_finding.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pageNoPage number, starting at 1.
sortNoSort column (default: exploited first, then severity).
orderNoasc or desc.
searchNoMatch CVE id, package or title.
fixableNoOnly findings with (true) or without (false) a fix.
statusesNoOnly these disposition statuses (e.g. active, resolved, accepted).
namespaceNoOnly findings observed in this namespace.
page_sizeNoResults per page (default 50).
addon_slugNoOnly findings attributed to this add-on.
cluster_idNoOnly findings observed on this cluster (UUID).
severitiesNoOnly these severities (critical, high, medium, low, unknown).
known_exploitedNoOnly CISA known-exploited findings.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, so 'Read-only' is largely confirmatory rather than additive. The description still adds real behavior: the default result ordering (exploited-in-the-wild first, then severity) and the breadth of scope across every scanned cluster, which an agent cannot infer from the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the verb and purpose, then filters, then the alternative tool. Dense but every sentence does work, with only minor redundancy in 'Read-only' duplicating the readOnlyHint annotation.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description correctly carries the return-value burden by naming the fields surfaced (KEV, EPSS, affected clusters/workloads, fixability). Filters, default ordering and the drill-down path are covered; only pagination behavior and differentiation from the other security-list siblings are left implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all twelve parameters are already documented (including defaults for page, page_size and sort). The description restates the filterable facets (severity, status, fixable, known_exploited, cluster, add-on, namespace, search) without adding syntax, accepted values, or combinations beyond the schema. Baseline 3 when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('List the organisation's security findings'), scopes it precisely ('CVEs across every scanned cluster'), and names what is returned (KEV/EPSS intelligence, affected clusters/workloads, fixability). The closing pointer to get_security_finding distinguishes it from the drill-down sibling.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context for when to use it (fleet-wide CVE listing with exploitation prioritisation) and explicitly routes the agent to get_security_finding for a single-finding drill-down. It does not contrast with adjacent listers such as list_security_finding_occurrences or list_security_sbom_image_findings, so no explicit when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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