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Get security SBOM component

get_security_sbom_component
Read-only

Follow one exact package to where it runs: the images whose bill of materials names that package name, version and ecosystem, every workload container currently running those images (cluster, namespace, kind, name, container, image), and the clusters they run on with per-cluster workload and image counts. Read-only. This is the tool for "where do we run this AGPL package" or "which workloads carry this vulnerable version": start from a row of list_security_sbom_components and pass its exact name, version and package_type. Lists are capped (200 images, 500 workload containers) and say so with images_capped / workloads_capped.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "name": "<name>",
      "package_type": "<package_type>"
    },
    "name": "get_security_sbom_component"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesThe package name exactly as the component list shows it (case-insensitive).
versionNoThe exact installed version the component list shows; empty when the list shows no version.
cluster_idNoOnly the images, workload containers and clusters on this cluster (UUID); omit for the whole fleet.
package_typeYesThe ecosystem the component list shows (apk, deb, rpm, npm, pypi, golang, maven, ...).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation (which 'Read-only' merely echoes), it discloses the exact result shape — images, workload containers with cluster/namespace/kind/name/container/image, and clusters with per-cluster workload and image counts — and, critically, the truncation contract: lists are capped at 200 images and 500 workload containers and flag this via images_capped / workloads_capped. Those caps and flags are behavior an agent could not infer from any structured field.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with the core purpose and then layers the trigger examples, the entry-point workflow, and the capping contract in a logical order with no filler. The parenthetical field enumeration (cluster, namespace, kind, name, container, image) is the only slightly dense stretch, but it pays for itself by telling the agent what it will receive.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so — listing the three result groups, their key fields, and the truncation indicators. Combined with the stated read-only nature and the exact-match input workflow, an agent has everything needed to call it correctly and interpret the response.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds provenance and precision guidance the schema lacks: the parameter values must come verbatim from a list_security_sbom_components row, and version is described as the installed version tied to that row. cluster_id scoping is left entirely to the schema description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a precise verb+resource statement: follow one exact package (name, version, ecosystem) to the images whose BOM names it, the workload containers running those images, and the clusters hosting them. That is specific enough to distinguish it from list_security_sbom_components, get_security_sbom_image, and list_security_sbom_containers without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives concrete trigger questions ('where do we run this AGPL package', 'which workloads carry this vulnerable version') and an explicit entry workflow: start from a row of list_security_sbom_components and pass its exact name, version and package_type. What is missing is the inverse routing — it never says to use get_security_sbom_image or list_security_sbom_containers when starting from an image rather than a package.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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