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get_security_sbom_component

Read-only

Follow one exact package to where it runs: the images whose bill of materials names that package name, version and ecosystem, every workload container currently running those images (cluster, namespace, kind, name, container, image), and the clusters they run on with per-cluster workload and image counts. Read-only. This is the tool for "where do we run this AGPL package" or "which workloads carry this vulnerable version": start from a row of list_security_sbom_components and pass its exact name, version and package_type. Lists are capped (200 images, 500 workload containers) and say so with images_capped / workloads_capped.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesThe package name exactly as the component list shows it (case-insensitive).
versionNoThe exact installed version the component list shows; empty when the list shows no version.
cluster_idNoOnly the images, workload containers and clusters on this cluster (UUID); omit for the whole fleet.
package_typeYesThe ecosystem the component list shows (apk, deb, rpm, npm, pypi, golang, maven, ...).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

readOnlyHint=true already covers the safety profile, and the description reinforces it with 'Read-only.' More valuable is the disclosure of truncation behavior: lists are capped at 200 images and 500 workload containers and flagged via images_capped / workloads_capped — context annotations do not provide. It omits any note on auth/permissions, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three dense sentences, zero filler: purpose and result shape first, read-only and caps second, routing instructions third. Every clause carries information the agent needs to select and call the tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, so the description must describe returns — and it does, listing the workload-container fields (cluster, namespace, kind, name, container, image) and per-cluster counts, plus the cap flags. For a read-only trace tool this is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning beyond the schema by explaining where the values come from — the exact name/version/package_type shown in a component list row — and tying ecosystem to package_type. That provenance guidance is genuinely beyond the field-level descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource with scope: 'Follow one exact package to where it runs' and enumerates the three linked result sets (images, workload containers, clusters). It also names its upstream sibling, list_security_sbom_components, so an agent can distinguish it from get_security_sbom_image and the other SBOM tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete trigger questions ('where do we run this AGPL package', 'which workloads carry this vulnerable version') and an explicit entry path: start from a row of list_security_sbom_components and pass its exact name, version and package_type. This is exactly the when-to-use and how-to-route guidance an agent needs.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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