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get_security_advisory

Read-only

The platform's advisory for one CVE: the parsed NVD/OSV record, CISA's guidance and due dates when the CVE is known-exploited, EPSS exploitation likelihood, and the organisation's own fleet exposure to it. Works for any CVE id, present in the fleet or not. Read-only.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYesCVE id, e.g. CVE-2025-1234.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, so the 'Read-only' sentence is largely redundant. What earns credit is the disclosure of the underlying data sources and composition (parsed NVD/OSV, CISA known-exploited guidance and due dates, EPSS likelihood, fleet exposure), which tells the agent what kind of answer to expect. Auth requirements and rate limits are not mentioned.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core object ('advisory for one CVE'), followed by the returned contents and a scope caveat. Dense but every clause carries information, except the trailing 'Read-only' which duplicates the annotation. Two sentences, no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the full burden of explaining the return payload and it does so explicitly, enumerating the four data components the advisory merges. Combined with the any-CVE scope note, an agent has everything needed to call it and interpret the result.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single parameter already carries an example format ('CVE id, e.g. CVE-2025-1234'), so the description adds no syntax or format meaning beyond the schema. Baseline 3 is correct when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('the platform's advisory for one CVE') and enumerates exactly what the advisory aggregates (NVD/OSV record, CISA guidance/due dates, EPSS likelihood, fleet exposure). This is far more specific than a generic 'get' tool and separates it from aggregate siblings like get_security_overview. It does not explicitly name an alternative, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The line 'Works for any CVE id, present in the fleet or not' is a useful scope boundary telling the agent the CVE need not be in the fleet. However, there is no explicit when-to-use vs when-to-use-something-else guidance against the many security siblings (get_security_finding, get_security_sbom_image, list_security_findings). Usage is implied rather than directed.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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