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Get application security versions

get_application_security_versions
Read-only

Every pushed image version of an application with its security metadata: per tag the digest, push time, whether a bill of materials exists (component count, base OS, licence exposure), the findings on it (scanned or not, actionable by severity, known-exploited, fixable-severe) and where it runs now (workloads, clusters, namespaces). Also the source repository's visibility and the licence obligations the newest scanned versions impose (source_disclosure_required for network-copyleft packages in a private repository, service_licence_required for source-available ones). Read-only. registry_status says whether the registry could be listed, so an unreachable registry never reads as 'nothing pushed'.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "application_id": "<application_id>"
    },
    "name": "get_application_security_versions"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
componentNoNarrow a monorepo application to one component.
application_idYesApplication id or name.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Read-only is already in the annotations, but the description adds genuine behavioral context beyond them: it explains the failure-mode semantics of registry_status so an unreachable registry is not misread as "nothing pushed," and it defines what the licence-obligation flags mean (source_disclosure_required for network-copyleft in a private repo, service_licence_required for source-available). It does not cover pagination or how many versions are returned, which is the main remaining gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Content is front-loaded with the resource and scope, and the two short trailing sentences earn their place by covering the licence flags and the registry_status caveat. The main structural weakness is the opening sentence, which is a very long run-on with nested parentheticals that is harder to scan than a short bulleted field list would be.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the full burden of describing return values, and it does so comprehensively: per-tag metadata, findings, runtime placement, repository visibility, licence obligations, and the registry_status sentinel. Combined with a single required parameter and a read-only annotation, an agent has everything needed to call this correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and both parameters are documented inline (application_id as id or name, component for monorepo narrowing). The description implies an application-scoped read but never mentions the component narrowing or accepts name-or-id, so it adds no meaning beyond the schema. Baseline 3 applies when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first clause names a concrete resource and scope: "Every pushed image version of an application with its security metadata," and the following clauses enumerate exactly which fields come back (digest, push time, SBOM presence, findings, workloads). An agent knows precisely what it will receive. It does not, however, name or distinguish itself from nearby siblings such as get_application_container_security, get_application_code_security, or list_security_sbom_images, so the boundary must be inferred.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: you call this when you want per-tag version history with security posture for a given application. There is no explicit "use this instead of X when Y" routing and no stated preconditions (e.g. application must be onboarded). The registry_status sentence is the closest thing to guidance, telling the agent how to interpret a failure case rather than when to call the tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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