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Enable security baseline

enable_security_baseline
Destructive

Publish the curated security baseline stack on a cluster (security.triage or security.manage): trivy-operator for vulnerability, SBOM and compliance scanning plus the pod-security policies in audit mode, committed to the cluster's GitOps repository and deployed on the next reconcile. Re-running on a cluster that has an older baseline appends the members it misses (the supported upgrade path); a cluster that already runs trivy-operator outside the baseline is refused. Reversible by deleting the stack.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "enable_security_baseline"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cluster_idNoCluster id (UUID). Optional when the conversation is bound to a cluster.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds substantial context beyond the annotations: it discloses the required permission scopes, that changes are committed to the cluster's GitOps repo and only take effect on the next reconcile (async), the exact refusal condition, and that the action is reversible by deleting the stack. That covers blast radius, authorization, and timing, all of which the annotations alone do not convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the action and its payload, then upgrade/refusal semantics, then reversibility. No restatement of the name or title, and every clause carries decision-relevant information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent one-parameter mutation with no output schema, the description covers authorization, side effects, async deployment, upgrade path, failure mode, and rollback. Nothing an agent needs in order to call it safely is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single optional cluster_id is fully documented in the schema, including the conversation-binding fallback. The description only implies the cluster target ('on a cluster') and adds no new meaning beyond that, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Publish') and resource ('curated security baseline stack') and names the concrete members (trivy-operator, pod-security policies in audit mode). An agent can distinguish this mutation from read-only siblings like get_cluster_baseline or list_cluster_security_stacks without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear conditions: requires security.triage or security.manage scope, re-running is the supported upgrade path, and a cluster already running trivy-operator outside the baseline is refused. It stops short of naming an alternative tool to use instead, but the when-to-use context is explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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