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Delete storage class

delete_storage_class
Destructive

Delete a StorageClass no PersistentVolumeClaim or PersistentVolume uses. The cluster's classes, volumes and claims are read live first: a class still in use is refused naming each claim (namespace/name) and volume that uses it, and the default class is refused (the AI assistant never changes the default class). If the read fails the call is refused with a 'Not checked' line. Volumes already provisioned from the class are not touched. Not reversible from here: recreating the class needs its exact provisioner and parameters (create_storage_class). The generic delete_resource refuses StorageClass, allow_bypass included. A person can delete any class in the Ankra UI or with ankra cluster delete storageclass <name>. Requires kubernetes.write.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "name": "<name>",
      "cluster_id": "<cluster_id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_storage_class"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesExact name of the StorageClass to delete.
cluster_idYesAnkra cluster id (UUID) the call targets. Discover ids with list_clusters.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, but the description goes well beyond them: it discloses that classes/volumes/claims are read live first, that refusals name the offending claim namespace/name and volumes, that a failed read fails closed with a 'Not checked' line, that already-provisioned volumes are untouched, and that the action is irreversible without the exact provisioner and parameters. It also states the required permission (kubernetes.write), which annotations do not carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the verb, resource, and the safety precondition, and each subsequent sentence carries distinct operational information (refusal reasons, fail-closed behavior, irreversibility, sibling routing). It runs long at seven sentences and the human-facing UI/CLI line is the most expendable, but nothing is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent, annotation-covered mutation with no output schema, the definition covers everything an agent needs: preconditions, refusal semantics, side effects on dependent volumes, reversibility, required permissions, and what to use instead when refused.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with only two parameters, both already documented (exact class name, Ankra cluster UUID discoverable via list_clusters). The description adds little per-parameter meaning beyond reinforcing that the name must be exact; the scaffolding around it is behavioral rather than parametric.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Delete a StorageClass") and immediately scopes it with a precondition ("no PersistentVolumeClaim or PersistentVolume uses"). It distinguishes itself from two siblings by name — delete_resource (which refuses StorageClass) and create_storage_class (the inverse operation) — so an agent can route correctly without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-not conditions: the call is refused if the class is in use or is the default, and delete_resource will not work even with allow_bypass. It also names the escape hatch for cases the tool refuses (Ankra UI or `ankra cluster delete storageclass <name>`), which is exactly the sort of alternative routing an agent needs.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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