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delete_resource

Destructive

Delete any Kubernetes resource, including cluster-scoped kinds and custom resources defined by CRDs in the cluster snapshot. Safety checks refuse deletes of protected kinds and namespaces, ArgoCD-managed or stack-owned resources, protected RBAC objects, and attached PersistentVolumes — with allow_bypass=true (only when the user explicitly asked for the deletion) every check is lifted and the delete still requires the user's confirmation. Objects owned by a Helm release are additionally checked against that release's live state: while the release is live the delete is refused until acknowledge_live_release names that specific release — allow_bypass never lifts this check.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kindYesResource kind (e.g., 'ConfigMap', 'Secret', 'Service'). For custom resources use the Kind from the cluster snapshot CRD index (e.g. 'Application', 'IngressRoute').
nameYesResource name to delete.
dry_runNoIf true, preview the change without executing it.
namespaceNoKubernetes namespace (not required for cluster-scoped resources).
cluster_idYesAnkra cluster id (UUID) the call targets. Discover ids with list_clusters.
api_versionNoAPI version (e.g., 'v1', 'apps/v1', or '<group>/<version>' for custom resources from the snapshot CRD index).v1
allow_bypassNoBypass every delete safety check (protected kind/namespace denylists, ArgoCD-managed and stack-owned guards, protected RBAC and attached-volume checks) except the live-Helm-release guard. Set ONLY when the user explicitly asked for this deletion (e.g. 'delete the argocd namespace', 'force', 'bypass'). The confirmation dialog still appears with an enhanced warning and nothing is deleted until the user approves.
acknowledge_live_releaseNoName of the live Helm release (or '<namespace>/<name>') whose ownership of this object the user explicitly acknowledged. Set ONLY after a delete was refused with type='helm_live_release' and the user confirmed deleting an object owned by that specific live release — allow_bypass does not lift this guard. The confirmation dialog still appears with an enhanced warning.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description goes well beyond them: it enumerates the exact guard categories (protected kinds/namespaces, ArgoCD/stack ownership, RBAC, attached PVs), explains that allow_bypass lifts all of them except the Helm live-release guard, and notes that a confirmation dialog always appears. This is the kind of 'what gets blocked and why' detail an agent cannot get from structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded in sentence one, with the safety model and flag semantics following in two dense but ordered sentences. Nothing is wasted, though the middle clause packs a long denylist that is slightly hard to parse on first read.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, 8-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers the full risk surface: what is protected, what bypass does and does not lift, and that user confirmation always intervenes. An agent has everything needed to decide whether to call it and with which flags.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the schema already documents allow_bypass and acknowledge_live_release in comparable detail, so the description largely restates the same bypass and live-release semantics. It adds the reframing that the confirmation dialog carries an 'enhanced warning', which is marginal; baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence gives a specific verb (Delete) and resource (any Kubernetes resource), then widens the scope explicitly to cluster-scoped kinds and CRD-defined custom resources. That scope statement is enough to distinguish it from narrower siblings like delete_pod or delete_cluster_variable without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear conditional guidance for the two escape-hatch flags: allow_bypass only when the user explicitly asked for the deletion, and acknowledge_live_release only after a helm_live_release refusal. It never names an alternative tool (e.g. delete_pod) or states a when-not-to-use case, so it stops short of full routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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