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Delete application env secret

delete_application_env_secret
Destructive

Clear the stored value of one of an Application's environment secrets. The key stays declared by the Application's manifests; only the value Ankra holds for it is removed, and Ankra cannot show that value again, so it cannot be recovered from here. Deployments already running keep the value sealed into them until the next apply_application_env_secrets.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "application_id": "<application_id>",
      "key": "<key>"
    },
    "name": "delete_application_env_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyYesThe environment variable name, exactly as the manifests spell it. Use list_application_env_secrets to see the declared keys.
application_idYesThe Application's id.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, but the description adds real substance beyond them: the value becomes unrecoverable ('Ankra cannot show that value again'), the key declaration survives, and running deployments keep the sealed value until the next apply_application_env_secrets. That downstream consequence is exactly the behavioral context an agent needs before invoking a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the action, then the irreversibility caveat, then the deployment consequence. Every sentence carries distinct information with no repetition of the name or title.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter destructive tool with full annotation and schema coverage, this covers the action, the blast radius, irreversibility, and the follow-up operation. Nothing needed to call it safely is missing, and no output schema is required for a delete-style operation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and both parameters are fully described, including the pointer to list_application_env_secrets for valid keys. The description itself adds no parameter-level syntax or format detail, so the schema is doing all the work here.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a precise verb and object ('Clear the stored value of one of an Application's environment secrets') and immediately distinguishes the operation from deleting the key itself, since 'The key stays declared by the Application's manifests'. That contrast separates it from siblings like delete_secret, set_application_env_secret, and list_application_env_secrets.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It establishes the context for use (removing a held value without undeclaring the key) and names the follow-up tool apply_application_env_secrets. It stops short of an explicit 'use set_application_env_secret to change the value instead' routing statement, so the alternative is implied rather than spelled out.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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