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Delete alert destination

delete_alert_destination
Destructive

Delete an alert destination. Every notification route and alert that delivers to it stops reaching it, and a webhook destination's URL is gone for good. Check which routes use it with list_notification_routes first.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "destination_id": "<destination_id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_alert_destination"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
destination_idYesAlert destination id (UUID) from list_alert_destinations.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description adds genuinely new behavioral context: notification routes and alerts stop delivering, and a webhook URL is unrecoverable. It does not say whether deletion fails or cascades when routes still reference the destination, nor whether permissions beyond the standard are required.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action, then consequences, then the pre-check. Every sentence carries distinct information with no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive tool with annotations covering the safety profile and no output schema, the description covers impact and a recommended pre-step. The only remaining gap is failure behavior when routes still reference the destination.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single destination_id is documented as a UUID from list_alert_destinations, so the baseline is 3. The description adds no additional semantics about the id itself, and its suggested lookup tool (list_notification_routes) differs from the one named in the schema, slightly muddying the sourcing hint.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Delete an alert destination") and immediately distinguishes it from siblings by describing the downstream effect on notification routes and alerts, so an agent won't confuse it with delete_notification_route or update_alert_destination.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit prerequisite action — "Check which routes use it with list_notification_routes first" — which is real guidance for safe invocation. It lacks an explicit when-not or a pointer to update_alert_destination as the non-destructive alternative, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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