Skip to main content
Glama

Create security disposition

create_security_disposition
Destructive

Record a disposition for a finding. For a cluster vulnerability: acknowledge it (security.triage) or accept the risk (security.manage), scoped to the add-on the occurrence is attributed to, with a reason, an optional review deadline and whether it lapses when a fix ships. Every occurrence the selector matches is dispositioned at once - run preview_security_disposition first and put its match count in the proposal. Needs an active occurrence with high-confidence add-on attribution; one without is refused. For a Semgrep or Checkov finding that blocks the Ankra Pipelines image gate (scope repository_code, security.manage): record it as false_positive or accepted_risk (accepted_risk needs expires_at within a year), with a reason; the gate stops blocking on that rule in that file and names the disposition on every run it lets through, and the finding stays scanned and recorded. Use this for a reviewed false positive instead of adding an inline nosemgrep. A CRITICAL finding is refused. Reversible: revoke_security_disposition reopens the findings.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "disposition": "<disposition>"
    },
    "name": "create_security_disposition"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathNoWith scope repository_code: the file the finding is in, as get_application_code_security reports it (file_path).
toolNoWith scope repository_code: semgrep or checkov, the scanner that reported the finding (get_application_code_security).
scopeNoWhat the disposition is pinned to. For a cluster vulnerability, with occurrence_id: organisation_addon (the default) pins the add-on the occurrence is attributed to across the organisation and needs a high-confidence add-on attribution; namespace pins every workload in the occurrence's namespace on its cluster and survives rollouts and image rebuilds (the usual choice for accepting a transitive dependency's CVE in one application); workload pins the one workload (cluster, kind, namespace, name), and a Deployment's ReplicaSet pins the Deployment so it survives rollouts; image pins the image digest wherever it runs and lapses when the image is rebuilt. Use namespace, workload or image when the occurrence has no add-on attribution (operator-managed pods, plain manifests, control-plane pods, charts outside the catalogue, your own application images). repository_code is a Semgrep or Checkov finding of a pipeline repository: pass application_id or repository_id, tool, rule_id and path instead of occurrence_id, and the Ankra Pipelines image gate stops blocking on that rule in that file while the disposition is active. Never for a CRITICAL finding.
reasonNoWhy. Recorded on the audit trail and shown on every matched finding.
rule_idNoWith scope repository_code: the finding's rule id, as get_application_code_security reports it.
expires_atNoReview deadline as an RFC 3339 timestamp; the policy reads as expiring / expired around it.
dispositionYesacknowledged (we know, working on it) or accepted_risk (we will live with it, needs security.manage). With scope repository_code: false_positive (the rule does not apply to this code) or accepted_risk.
occurrence_idNoOccurrence id (UUID) from get_security_finding or list_security_finding_occurrences - the anchor the policy's selector is derived from. Required unless scope is repository_code.
repository_idNoWith scope repository_code: the pipeline repository (UUID). Exactly one of application_id or repository_id.
application_idNoWith scope repository_code: the application (UUID) whose pipeline repository the finding belongs to. Exactly one of application_id or repository_id.
allow_unmatchedNoCreate the policy even when it currently matches no eligible occurrence (default false).
expire_when_fix_availableNoLapse automatically once a fixed version exists (default false).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / scope / description
      Previous value: -"What the disposition is pinned to. For a cluster vulnerability, with occurrence_id: organisation_addon (the default) pins the add-on the occurrence is attributed to across the organisation and needs a high-confidence add-on attribution; workload pins the one workload (cluster, kind, namespace, name); image pins the image digest wherever it runs. Use workload or image when the occurrence has no add-on attribution (operator-managed pods, plain manifests, control-plane pods, charts outside the catalogue). repository_code is a Semgrep or Checkov finding of a pipeline repository: pass application_id or repository_id, tool, rule_id and path instead of occurrence_id, and the Ankra Pipelines image gate stops blocking on that rule in that file while the disposition is active. Never for a CRITICAL finding."New value: +"What the disposition is pinned to. For a cluster vulnerability, with occurrence_id: organisation_addon (the default) pins the add-on the occurrence is attributed to across the organisation and needs a high-confidence add-on attribution; namespace pins every workload in the occurrence's namespace on its cluster and survives rollouts and image rebuilds (the usual choice for accepting a transitive dependency's CVE in one application); workload pins the one workload (cluster, kind, namespace, name), and a Deployment's ReplicaSet pins the Deployment so it survives rollouts; image pins the image digest wherever it runs and lapses when the image is rebuilt. Use namespace, workload or image when the occurrence has no add-on attribution (operator-managed pods, plain manifests, control-plane pods, charts outside the catalogue, your own application images). repository_code is a Semgrep or Checkov finding of a pipeline repository: pass application_id or repository_id, tool, rule_id and path instead of occurrence_id, and the Ankra Pipelines image gate stops blocking on that rule in that file while the disposition is active. Never for a CRITICAL finding."
  2. Changed9 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / application_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "With scope repository_code: the application (UUID) whose pipeline repository the finding belongs to. Exactly one of application_id or repository_id.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / properties / disposition / description
      Previous value: -"acknowledged (we know, working on it) or accepted_risk (we will live with it, needs security.manage)."New value: +"acknowledged (we know, working on it) or accepted_risk (we will live with it, needs security.manage). With scope repository_code: false_positive (the rule does not apply to this code) or accepted_risk."
    • changedInput schema / properties / occurrence_id / description
      Previous value: -"Occurrence id (UUID) from get_security_finding or list_security_finding_occurrences - the anchor the policy's selector is derived from."New value: +"Occurrence id (UUID) from get_security_finding or list_security_finding_occurrences - the anchor the policy's selector is derived from. Required unless scope is repository_code."
    • addedInput schema / properties / path
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "With scope repository_code: the file the finding is in, as get_application_code_security reports it (file_path).",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / repository_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "With scope repository_code: the pipeline repository (UUID). Exactly one of application_id or repository_id.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / rule_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "With scope repository_code: the finding's rule id, as get_application_code_security reports it.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / properties / scope / description
      Previous value: -"What the policy is pinned to, with occurrence_id: organisation_addon (the default) pins the add-on the occurrence is attributed to across the organisation and needs a high-confidence add-on attribution; workload pins the one workload (cluster, kind, namespace, name); image pins the image digest wherever it runs. Use workload or image when the occurrence has no add-on attribution (operator-managed pods, plain manifests, control-plane pods, charts outside the catalogue)."New value: +"What the disposition is pinned to. For a cluster vulnerability, with occurrence_id: organisation_addon (the default) pins the add-on the occurrence is attributed to across the organisation and needs a high-confidence add-on attribution; workload pins the one workload (cluster, kind, namespace, name); image pins the image digest wherever it runs. Use workload or image when the occurrence has no add-on attribution (operator-managed pods, plain manifests, control-plane pods, charts outside the catalogue). repository_code is a Semgrep or Checkov finding of a pipeline repository: pass application_id or repository_id, tool, rule_id and path instead of occurrence_id, and the Ankra Pipelines image gate stops blocking on that rule in that file while the disposition is active. Never for a CRITICAL finding."
    • addedInput schema / properties / tool
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "With scope repository_code: semgrep or checkov, the scanner that reported the finding (get_application_code_security).",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "occurrence_id",
      -  "disposition"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "disposition"
      +]
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false; the description goes well beyond that by disclosing blast radius ("Every occurrence the selector matches is dispositioned at once"), preconditions (active occurrence, high-confidence attribution), refusals (CRITICAL), side effects (the gate stops blocking but "the finding stays scanned and recorded"), audit behaviour (reason recorded and shown on every matched finding), and reversibility.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then the two scenarios, then the refusals and reversibility — a sensible order with no filler sentences. It is dense and long for a description, packing scope selection advice into prose that partly duplicates the schema, but every sentence carries operational information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 12-parameter destructive mutation with no output schema, it covers prerequisites, refusal conditions, side effects, audit trail and undo. The remaining gap is the return value: with no output schema and no statement of what the created disposition/policy looks like or what identifier comes back, an agent must infer the response shape.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description still adds real meaning by tying disposition values to required permissions (accepted_risk needs security.manage) and by adding the constraint that accepted_risk needs expires_at within a year, which is not in the schema. It does not add much beyond the schema for the scope/selector parameters, since their semantics are already spelled out in the schema text.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource ("Record a disposition for a finding") and immediately branches into the two concrete cases it handles: cluster vulnerability dispositions and repository_code gate dispositions for Semgrep/Checkov. It is clearly distinguishable from preview_security_disposition, revoke_security_disposition and update_security_disposition, which it names or implies by contrast.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit routing: "run preview_security_disposition first and put its match count in the proposal", and "Use this for a reviewed false positive instead of adding an inline nosemgrep." It also gives when-not conditions (refused for a CRITICAL finding, refused without high-confidence add-on attribution) and names revoke_security_disposition as the undo path.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.