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Connect log source

connect_log_source
Destructive

Propose connecting the log source Ankra derived from this cluster's installed addons (the one a query_logs refusal named). Pass EXACTLY the provider and endpoint from that refusal - both are re-derived server-side at execution and the call is refused on any mismatch, so never invent or edit them. The action requires an organisation admin's confirmation; on confirm the endpoint is first verified with the existing read-only probe (a failed probe writes nothing), then the source is registered in the resource graph as the cluster's log_source, inheriting GitOps, audit, drift detection and IaC export. An in-cluster Service endpoint needs no credential - the agent relay dials it from inside the cluster - so never ask the user for one. Do not use this to repair a misconfigured existing source. If the store runs OUTSIDE the cluster, or the derived endpoint does not match what the release actually renders, re-propose the correct endpoint with endpoint_is_operator_supplied=true: derivation only sees installed addons, so neither case can be derived and neither is a reason to refuse the connection. Admin confirmation and the read-only probe apply either way. If the external store requires authentication (the probe answers 401/403), pass credential_from_cluster_id naming a cluster in this organisation whose log source already queries the same store: the server copies that cluster's saved credential by reference and probes with it. NEVER ask the user to paste a password or token into chat - secret material must not transit this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "provider": "<provider>",
      "endpoint": "<endpoint>",
      "cluster_id": "<cluster_id>"
    },
    "name": "connect_log_source"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
endpointYesThe endpoint URL. Copy verbatim from the refusal's derived-candidate sentence, or supply the correct one with endpoint_is_operator_supplied=true when the store is external or the derived endpoint is wrong. Must be an http:// or https:// URL. Private and in-cluster addresses are fine; loopback, link-local (including the cloud metadata address) and multicast are refused.
providerYesThe provider. Copy verbatim from the refusal's derived-candidate sentence, or supply it with endpoint_is_operator_supplied=true.
cluster_idYesAnkra cluster id (UUID) the call targets. Discover ids with list_clusters.
credential_from_cluster_idNoUUID of another cluster in the SAME organisation whose saved log credential should authenticate this source. Valid ONLY together with endpoint_is_operator_supplied=true. The server verifies that cluster belongs to this organisation, loads its stored log_credential (name, username, auth scheme, and the secret material from the secret store), runs the read-only probe WITH it, and only on success copies the credential onto this cluster and registers the source naming it - no password or token ever passes through the chat or this tool call. Use it when the external store refuses the unauthenticated probe (401/403) and a sibling cluster already queries the same store; never ask the user to paste the secret instead.
endpoint_is_operator_suppliedNoSet true ONLY when a person supplied this endpoint rather than copying Ankra's derived candidate. Derivation reads INSTALLED ADDONS, so it cannot name a store running outside the cluster (a managed OpenSearch, a hosted Prometheus) - that is the case this exists for. It skips the derived-candidate equality check ONLY: organisation-admin confirmation and the read-only probe still run, and the confirmation shows the endpoint as supplied rather than derived. Never set it to pass off an endpoint you inferred yourself.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, it discloses that an organisation admin must confirm, that the endpoint is verified with a read-only probe before any write, that a failed probe writes nothing, and that the source is registered in the resource graph inheriting GitOps, audit, drift detection, and IaC export. It also explains credential copying by reference and that secret material never transits the tool. This is consistent with destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but front-loads the core action and the exact-copy rule before moving through confirmation, probe, external-store, and credential cases. Every sentence carries a distinct constraint, though the repeated warnings about never requesting secrets could be tightened slightly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a five-parameter mutation tool with no output schema, the description covers the full lifecycle: derivation, exact parameter provenance, admin confirmation, read-only probe, failure behavior, resource-graph registration, external-store handling, and authentication via sibling-cluster credentials. It leaves no material gap for an agent to invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents each parameter thoroughly. The description still adds operational meaning: the provider and endpoint must be copied verbatim from the refusal because the server re-derives them and refuses mismatches; endpoint_is_operator_supplied is only for legitimate external or mismatched derivations; and credential_from_cluster_id is valid only with that flag and only when the probe returns 401/403.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Propose connecting the log source Ankra derived from this cluster's installed addons'. It identifies the exact originating context (the candidate named in a query_logs refusal) and makes clear this is a connection/registration action, not a query or repair operation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit when-to-use conditions (derived candidate from a refusal), when-not ('Do not use this to repair a misconfigured existing source'), and alternative paths for external stores or mismatched derivations via endpoint_is_operator_supplied=true. It also tells the agent what to do when the probe returns 401/403, using credential_from_cluster_id rather than asking for secrets.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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