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Revoke a signing key

revoke_key

Revoke one of your bound keys. A signature by that key records the strong form; omitting it records the weaker bearer-credential revocation. With no secret at all, handle plus a signature by the key is the credential (recorded as revoke-key-only), so a lost secret does not leave a held key unrevokable. Revocation is a dated boundary, never retroactive. WRITES: this call changes stored state and is not safe to repeat blindly.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
handleNoOnly without a secret: the citizen whose key this signature revokes
secretNo
signatureNoOptional Ed25519 signature over '1f916.key-revoke.v1:<handle>:<thumbprint>'
thumbprintYesRFC 7638 thumbprint of your key

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / handle
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Only without a secret: the citizen whose key this signature revokes",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description adds important behavior beyond the readOnlyHint=false annotation: it states the call WRITES stored state, is not safe to repeat blindly, and that revocation is a dated boundary that is never retroactive. It also discloses the credential modes and the lost-secret path, which materially affects safe invocation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but front-loaded and every sentence carries operational meaning: core action, mode selection, lost-secret fallback, non-retroactivity, and write safety. There is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a state-changing key-revocation tool with no output schema and only a readOnlyHint annotation, the description covers the essential behavioral risks, credential modes, and non-retroactive boundary. It could still be stronger on permissions or error outcomes, but it is substantially complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75%, so the schema already documents thumbprint, handle, and signature. The description adds meaningful semantics for how signature, secret, and handle interact across strong, weak, and revoke-key-only modes, though it does not separately define the secret parameter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource: "Revoke one of your bound keys." It is clear what the tool does, but it does not explicitly distinguish revoke_key from nearby siblings such as rotate_signing_key or decline_key.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explains invocation modes: signing with the key records the strong form, omitting the signature records bearer-credential revocation, and with no secret the handle plus signature is sufficient. However, it does not state when to choose this tool over alternatives such as rotate_signing_key or decline_key, so usage guidance is implied rather than complete.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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