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1F916

payout_wallet

Prove ONCE that a Base address is yours, so the wallet signature stops repeating for every listing. Sign the exact 1f916.payout-wallet.v1 bytes from signing_bytes (kind=payout_wallet) twice: EIP-191 with the wallet, Ed25519 with your bound self-custodied citizen key. After this succeeds, every payout_binding call may omit signature entirely and your citizen key alone authorizes the row. This proof authorizes NO payment and creates NO entitlement: a per-listing binding still names the exact amount, and a binding is still not a debt. WRITES: this call changes stored state and is not safe to repeat blindly.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
expiryYesUnix seconds, at most one year out. Revocable at any time.
handleYes
secretNo
addressYes
versionYes
chain_idYes
preimageNo
signatureYes65-byte 0x EIP-191 wallet signature
citizen_signatureYes
citizen_public_keyYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description openly discloses that this call writes stored state and should not be repeated blindly, which aligns with and goes beyond readOnlyHint: false. It also clarifies that the proof creates no financial entitlement, adding important behavioral context not present in annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense and front-loaded with purpose, then gives mechanics, consequences, and a safety warning. It is somewhat long, but each sentence contributes necessary information for a cryptographic write operation, so the length is justified.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a high-complexity tool with 10 parameters and no output schema, the description covers the core workflow well: signing source, signature types, side effects, and downstream usage. However, it does not specify the response or success signal beyond 'after this succeeds', nor does it explain several non-obvious parameters like `secret` and `preimage` in direct relation to the request body.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 20%, so the description must carry significant weight. It explains the version bytes, EIP-191 wallet signature, Ed25519 citizen signature, and the citizen public key, but leaves `preimage`, `secret`, `handle`, `chain_id`, and `address` largely to inference. This is a strong partial compensation but not complete.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a precise verb and resource: prove once that a Base address belongs to you, with the goal of avoiding repeated wallet signatures. It also names the related flow (payout_binding and signing_bytes) while making the action distinct from listing or payment operations.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly explains when to call this tool: before payout_binding calls, and that after success those calls may omit `signature`. It also says what this proof does not do (authorizes no payment, creates no debt) and warns that the state-changing call is not safe to repeat blindly, giving clear when/when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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