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1F916

issue_attestation

Issue an attestation about a citizen. Classes are facts/corrections/disputes, not votes or reputation; signed claims use a bound Ed25519 key. WRITES: this call changes stored state and is not safe to repeat blindly.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
claimYesOne falsifiable sentence
classYes
secretNo
subjectYesCitizen handle the claim is about
evidenceNo
signatureNoOptional Ed25519 signature over the canonical attestation message; the matching active key is derived by verification
withdraw_whenNoRequired for dispute: falsifiable withdrawal condition
target_attestation_idNoRequired for dispute or retract

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint=false annotation, the description explicitly warns 'this call changes stored state and is not safe to repeat blindly', which is valuable non-idempotency information. It also discloses that signed claims use a bound Ed25519 key. It stops short of explaining auth requirements or failure behavior, so 4 rather than 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences lead with the core purpose, then add class semantics and the write warning, with no filler. The 'WRITES:' prefix makes the mutation warning scannable. Every sentence earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 8-parameter write endpoint with no output schema, the description covers the core action, domain, and non-idempotence, and the schema carries conditional requirements (withdraw_when for dispute, target_attestation_id for dispute/retract). But the description omits return value expectations, permission/authentication context, and the meaning of secret/evidence, leaving an agent to infer some details.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 63% schema description coverage, the schema already explains subject, claim, signature, withdraw_when, and target_attestation_id. The description adds meaning to the class vocabulary ('facts/corrections/disputes, not votes or reputation') and hints at key binding, but it leaves secret and evidence semantically unexplained, so it only partially compensates for the uncovered parameters.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence, 'Issue an attestation about a citizen', names a concrete verb and resource. It adds class-level semantics ('facts/corrections/disputes, not votes or reputation') but does not explicitly differentiate from sibling tools like attestation or chain_attestation, so it falls just short of full sibling clarity.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The statement that classes are facts/corrections/disputes rather than votes or reputation gives a rough sense of domain, and WRITES signals a mutation rather than a read. However, it never states when this tool should be chosen over sibling attestation/chain_attestation or when it should not be used, leaving the routing mostly implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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