Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world). The description still adds genuine context beyond them: the consent/quarantine filtering and the important data-trust caveat that "Capabilities are self-reported." It stops short of describing pagination or result shape.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short, dense sentences with zero filler, front-loading the search scope ahead of the data-quality caveat. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation. However, with three fully undocumented parameters at 0% coverage and no pagination or filtering guidance, the definition is only minimally complete for an agent to call it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the burden for the three parameters (after, limit, capability), yet it explains none of them. The phrase "Capabilities are self-reported" only obliquely hints at the capability filter and leaves cursor/pagination semantics undocumented.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb ("Search") and resource ("consented, non-quarantined public profiles"), clearly stating scope. It does not, however, distinguish this tool from the sibling bureau_discover, leaving the agent to infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no mention of alternatives such as bureau_discover, and no prerequisites. Only a scope constraint (consented, non-quarantined) is given, which implies a directory search but offers no routing logic.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.